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In the past traditional communications were based on letters, payments were done using
checks or cash, and secret documents were saved in sealed boxes. Today everything is
changed, and is changing quickly. Everyday more people buy cell phones, the number
of e-mail users goes up, and more people pay their payments over the internet. Paperless
office strategies save and process documents in electronic format. These trends are going
to make the life easier but at the same time produce security risks. Traditional paper-
based systems have been developed during a long time, in parallel to suitable laws for
their security and reliability. The rapid development of electronic communication systems
requires a secure infrastructure, too. Cryptography is the mathematical tool which is
used by security engineers to secure data against unauthorized access or manipulation.
Cryptography supplies the people, who are responsible for security, the required utilities
to hide data, control accesses to them, verify their integrity, and estimate the required cost
and time to break the security.
Like every other useful service, security will not be achieved for free. Implement-
ing cryptography tasks costs time, money, and energy. The focus of this work is about
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the design of an FPGA-based1 elliptic curve cryptography co-processor (ECCo) and the
study of different techniques which can be used to increase its performance. Such a co-
processor can influence applications in different ways: By increasing the speed, it enables
more people to use the system in the same time and increases the availability. It can re-
duce the overall system costs. If energy consumption is minimized, this processor can
decrease the total energy, and for example increase the battery lifetime in cell phones.
Such improvements can be done in different levels as we see in Chapter 2. Implementing
a fast co-processor, in this work, is done by studying the well-known methods in differ-
ent areas. But the proposed novel improvements concern finite field multiplication only.
This task is at the root of elliptic curve cryptography and every improvement in that can
influence directly the performance of the co-processor. Finite fields of characteristic 2
are specially attractive for hardware designers since computation in these fields does not
produce a carry, which contributes to long and complicated paths in hardware designs. It
is the main reason that we study such fields.
There are two popular kinds of cryptographic protocols, namely public key and private
key protocols. In private key protocols, a common key is used by both communication
partners and for both encryption and decryption. Among them are DES, IDEA, and AES.
These systems provide high speed but have the drawback that a common key must be
established for each pair of participants. In public key protocols we have two keys, one is
kept private and used either for decryption (confidentiality) or encryption (signature) of
messages. The other key, the public key, is published to be used for the reverse operation.
RSA, ElGamal, and DSS are examples of public key systems. These systems are slower
than the symmetric ones, but they provide arbitrarily high levels of security and do not
require an initial private key exchange. In real applications, both types are used. The pub-
lic key algorithm first establishes a common private key over an insecure channel. Then
the symmetric system is used for secure communication with high throughput. When this
key expires after some time, a new key is established via the public key algorithm again.
1Field Programmable Gate Array
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Due to the comparative slowness of the public key algorithms, dedicated hardware
support is desirable. In the second chapter of this work, we present different structures
for FPGA-based implementations of a cryptographic co-processor using elliptic curves.
Then we will present some results about efficient finite field arithmetic which can be used
to improve the performance of such processors. FPGA-based cryptography co-processors
avoid a series of drawbacks of ASIC2 based systems:
• A cryptography algorithm is secure as long as no effective attack is found. If this
happens, the algorithm must be replaced. FPGAs facilitate a fast and cost effective
way of exchanging the algorithm, in particular of switching to a higher key length.
• In electronic commerce servers, cryptographic algorithms can be exchanged often
for the purpose of adaption to the current workload, depending on the type of cryp-
tography that is mainly used (public key or symmetric key). This can be done by
exploiting the FPGAs reconfigurability.
• Elliptic curve cryptosystems possess several degrees of freedom like Galois field
characteristic, extension degree, elliptic curve parameters, or the fixed point gener-
ating the working subgroup on the curve. FPGAs allow for an effortless adaption
to changing security or workload requirements.
• The empirical results of testing various approaches on an FPGA may later be of
help in designing an efficient ASIC, where such experiments would be much more
costly.
1.1 Related Works and Document Structure
The contributions of the present work can be summarized in the following items:
• The comparison of the costs of polynomial and normal basis arithmetic in two-input
and FPGA models in Section 2.2.
2Application-Specific Integrated Circuit
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• Analyzing the effect of different point representations on the performance of paral-
lel implementations of elliptic curve cryptography over fields of characteristic 2 in
Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
• Implementing a very fast FPGA-based ECCo using parallel arithmetic units in Sec-
tion 2.5.
• Analyzing combinations of different recursive polynomial multiplications to reduce
the area requirements of hardware implementations in Section 3.3.
• Decreasing the latency of pipelined recursive polynomial multipliers by decreasing
the recursion degree in Section 3.4.
• Introducing a new structure for efficient changing between polynomial representa-
tions and optimal normal bases of type II in special finite fields. This technique
which is introduced in Chapter 4 results in efficient normal basis multipliers which
are analyzed in that chapter.
Due to the importance of elliptic curve cryptography, there are a lot of publications
in this area. The following paragraphs describe the document structure together with the
most important publications related to each chapter.
Chapter 1, this chapter, is the opening of the work and contains pointers to references
for further information. It begins with a very short introduction to cryptography and the
group of points on an elliptic curve, and is continued with an overview of the structure of
the specific FPGAs which are used. These topics are followed with the definitions of the
cost parameters which are considered when designing the circuits. Finally this chapter is
concluded with some possible applications where the results of this work can be applied.
A sample application, a PCI-based cryptography co-processor, has been implemented and
the benchmarks are presented. It should be mentioned, that the materials in this chapter
are in no way, a complete text book about cryptography or FPGAs. We assume, that the
reader is familiar with finite fields and basic hardware methods like pipelining.
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Chapter 2 describes the steps of the design and implementation of an elliptic curve co-
processor (ECCo). The ECCo should be optimized to have small area. Comparisons have
been performed between multipliers which can be adapted to tight area constraints. Since
the target platforms are FPGAs, implementation costs have been compared in classical
circuit analysis models and other models which are closer to the structure of the FPGAs
used. Some of the algorithms use a particular representation of points on an elliptic curve
called “mixed coordinates”. There are some computations considering the mixed coor-
dinates when fields of characteristic 2 are used. These results can be derived from the
works of Lo´pez & Dahab (1999b) and Cohen et al. (1998). Materials of this chapter
which are the results of cooperation with the working group AGTeich are already pub-
lished in Bednara et al. (2002a) and Bednara et al. (2002b). There are several other works
which describe the application of FPGAs for elliptic curve curve cryptography or finite
field arithmetic (see Gao et al. (1999), Gregory et al. (1999), Leong & Leung (2002),
Orlando & Paar (1999) and Lutz & Hasan (2004)). The distinguishing factor in our work
is the application of parallelism in both bit and finite field operations. As we will see in
Chapter 2, the area and time costs of finite field multipliers grow faster than linear when
the number of output-bits per clock-cycle is increased. This shows that it is always better
to use as many small parallel multipliers as possible instead of using a single multiplier
with a large number of output bits per clock cycle. Unfortunately the performance of the
FPGA-based systems depends on the platform used and a direct comparison is possible
only when considering the same target FPGA. From the above implementations the only
comparable work belongs to Lutz & Hasan (2004) which requires 0.233 ms for a point
multiplication on a generic curve over F2163 , when a clock frequency of 66 MHz is used.
Our design on the other hand requires 0.18 ms for a generic curve over F2191 with the
same clock frequency and on the same FPGA. It should be pointed out that their design is
optimized for the Koblitz curves (see Hankerson et al. (2003)) and not generic cases.
Chapter 3 can be considered the most important part of this thesis. It contains results
about applications of asymptotically fast multiplication in hardware. These methods have
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been known for a long time but their high crossover points in software did not let design-
ers enjoy their high performance in practical situations. Software implementations of the
Karatsuba multipliers using general purpose processors have been discussed thoroughly
in the literature (see Paar (1994), Bailey & Paar (1998), Koc¸ & Erdem (2002), Hankerson
et al. (2003), Chapter 2, and von zur Gathen & Gerhard (2003), Chapter 8). There are,
on the contrary, only few publications about the hardware implementations. Jung et al.
(2002) and Weimerskirch & Paar (2003) suggest the use of algorithms with O(n2) oper-
ations to multiply polynomials which contain a prime number of bits. The number of bit
operations is, by a constant factor, smaller than the classical method and yet asymptoti-
cally larger than those for the Karatsuba method. Grabbe et al. (2003a) propose a hybrid
implementation of the Karatsuba method which reduces the latency by pipelining and by
mixing sequential and combinational circuits. The goal of this chapter is to present a
method to decrease the resource usage of polynomial multipliers by means of both known
algorithmic and platform dependent methods. This is achieved by computing the best
choice of hybrid multiplication algorithms which multiply polynomials with at most 8192
bits using six recursive methods, namely: classical, Karatsuba, a variant of Karatsuba
for quadratic polynomials, and three methods of Montgomery (2005) for polynomials of
degrees 4, 5, and 6, respectively. In addition to the above algorithmic, or machine inde-
pendent optimization we use a second type of optimization, which is machine-dependent,
to design a 240-bit multiplier with small area-time cost. This 240-bit multiplier covers
in particular the 233-bit polynomials proposed by NIST for elliptic curve cryptography
(FIPS PUB 186-2 (2000)). Many of the materials of this chapter are new results and some
of them are published in Grabbe et al. (2003a), von zur Gathen & Shokrollahi (2005), and
von zur Gathen & Shokrollahi (2006). For example, finding the optimum hybrid limits,
decreasing the number of recursive stages, and the code generator.
Chapter 4 describes the use of sub-quadratic multiplication methods for normal basis
arithmetic in finite fields. Amin Shokrollahi initiated the discoveries in this chapter. Nor-
mal bases are popularized in finite fields because of the ease of squaring but they have
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the drawback that multiplication in these bases is more expensive than in polynomial
bases. Multiplication in normal bases of small type has important applications in cryp-
tography, so that most of cryptography standards suggest the use of finite fields which
contain such bases (see FIPS PUB 186-2 (2000)). There are several works detailing the
implementation of these multiplications, starting with Omura & Massey (1986) which in-
troduced the Massey-Omura multiplier. Mullin et al. (1989) define optimal normal bases,
which minimize the area and the time complexities of this multiplier and Gao & Lenstra
(1992) specify exactly the finite fields for which optimal normal bases exist. Follow-
ing these works there are several proposals for the efficient multiplications using optimal
normal bases and especially those of type 2. The parallel Massey-Omura multiplier for
F2n can be implemented, with at least n(3n − 2) gates, whereas multiplications of poly-
nomials of degree n − 1 is done, classically, using 2n2 − 2n + 1 gates. Sunar & Koc¸
(2001) and Reyhani-Masoleh & Hasan (2002) decrease the cost of type 2 multiplication
to n(5n − 1)/2 by suitably modifying the Massey-Omura multiplier. Gao et al. (2000),
on the other hand, decrease the multiplication cost in optimal normal bases of type 2, as-
ymptotically, to 2M(n), where M(n) is the cost of multiplying two polynomials of degree
n− 1 (of length n). This allows the application of asymptotically fast polynomial multi-
plication methods for normal bases as well. The structure reported in Chapter 3 decreases
this cost asymptotically to M(n) +O(n logn) by the addition of a suitable small size cir-
cuit to a polynomial multiplier. This small circuit is used to convert from the normal basis
to an appropriate polynomial representation. A comparison of the area of this multiplier
with the other proposed architectures in the literature shows its suitability for small area
implementations. Results of this chapter can also be used for efficient change of basis be-
tween the polynomial and the normal bases as a mechanism against side-channel attacks
(see Park et al. (2003)). Chapter 5 summarizes the results of this work.
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1.2 Cryptography
In this section we describe the two kinds of cryptography systems, namely public and
private key systems. The results of this work can be used in cryptography systems but
are not directly cryptographical results. Hence, we avoid formal definitions and limit
ourselves to brief explanations which are sufficient to represent applications of this work.
1.2.1 Private Key Cryptography
Almost all cryptographic protocols are based on the same principle. They contain a func-
tion which, by means of a parameter called the encryption key, can be easily computed.
The inverse of this function is hard to compute unless a trapdoor function (a second key
corresponding to the former one) is known. A general assumption made during the analy-
sis of the security of a system is that all information about the system except the trapdoor
key are known by the adversary. The previously mentioned group of public and private
key systems are based on the way these keys are generated and kept.
In a private key system encryption and decryption are done using the same key which
should be kept secret, otherwise the system is broken. Figure 1.1 shows a scenario where
communication is secured via a private key system. Here Eve does not know the private
key and cannot get any information even if she has access to the channel.
There are several private key algorithms like Rijndael (AES) and 3DES. Private key
systems are generally characterized by very high performance. But they cannot normally
be used alone. Their applications will be completed with public key cryptosystems which
are introduced in Diffie & Hellman (1976).
1.2.2 Public Key Cryptography
As we have already mentioned private key systems are generally very efficient but there
is the need for other kinds of cryptosystems in practice. Consider as an example the
setup in Figure 1.1. Alice and Bob have never met each other and their only connection
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Figure 1.1: A private key cryptography scenario
is a channel which is accessible to Eve. In this case they have never the possibility of
establishing a common secret key using private key cryptosystems only. As another case
consider the scenario in which instead of Alice and Bob, a group of 1000 people want to
communicate with each other. In this case every user requires 999 keys and the overall
system requires 999000 keys to be generated.
In public key cryptosystems encryption and decryption are done using two different
keys. One of the keys is published and the other is kept secret. When one party is going
to sign a message the encryption key is kept secret but the key to verify the signature will
be published. On the other hand when a secret message is to be sent the encryption key
will be published while the key to open the message will be kept secret by the owner.
Figure 1.2 is an example for a public key system where the information should be kept
secret during transmission. In this system messages sent to a user are encrypted by his
encryption system and he is the only person who has access to the corresponding private
key and can decrypt the message.
There are several types of public key cryptosystems. A major group of these systems
is based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem or DLP for short. In
the next section we explain the elliptic curve variant of this problem.
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Figure 1.2: A public key cryptography scenario
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1.2.3 Elliptic Curves and the Discrete Logarithm Problem
Let E be an elliptic curve defined, in the affine version, by the Weierstrass equation:
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6,
which is defined over a finite field K. It can be shown, that there is a group associated
with the points on this curve (see Silverman (1986), Chapter III, Section 2, Page 55 for the
proof). The operation of this group, the addition of points, is defined in a special manner
which is shown in Figure 1.3. Let S and Q, in the part (a) of that figure, be two distinct
points on an elliptic curve. There is a straight line through these points which intersects
the curve in another third point, −R in that figure. The mirror of −R with respect to the
x-axis is a new point, R, which is defined as the sum of S and Q. When a point is added
to itself the tangent line at that point is used instead, as shown in Figure 1.3-b. Like the
last case, the sum is computed as the mirror of the next intersection with respect to the
x-axis. As a common precept in group theory, here a zero element is needed. It can be
easily verified, that if the straight line through a point is parallel to the y-axis, it intersects
the curve in the mirror of the original point with respect to the x-axis. Mirroring this point
results in the original point. The zero point O is virtually defined to be in the infinity on
the y-axis to achieve a line which is parallel to the y-axis for every point on the curve.
This point is generally called the “point at infinity”.
Now that we can add two points, distinct or equal, we can compute any integer mul-
tiple of a point. We call this operation the “point multiplication”. In this way nQ is the
point which is computed by n− 1 times addition of the point Q to itself. Since the set of
points generate a group this product is well defined and does not depend on the way the
points are added together. The aim of our co-processor is to compute nQ for a given Q
and an integer n, when the elliptic curve is already specified.
The DLP on elliptic curves is the problem of computing n from Q and nQ. It is gener-
ally assumed that, at least for general enough curves, this cannot be solved in polynomial
time, i.e., in a number of operations which is expressible in a polynomial of the bit-size










Figure 1.3: (a) Addition and (b) doubling of points on an elliptic curve
of the finite field, i.e., log2#F . It should be pointed out that for some very special elliptic
curves the DLP is known to be easy (see Blake et al. (1999), Chapter III, Section 3.2,
Page 37). We assume that the given finite field and the curve are not of this form. Our
elliptic curves, for fields of characteristic 2, are of the general form:
E : y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b,
with a, b ∈ F2n , b 6= 0.
To show where and how this project can be used, we describe some applications of
elliptic curve cryptography and how using an elliptic curve co-processor can improve the
performance of the system.
1.2.4 Applications
Key Establishment
Consider again the scenario presented in Figure 1.1. As we have already mentioned, if
Alice and Bob have never met each other they cannot agree upon a secure and common
private key. Even if they establish a key and later doubt the security of this key (for
example if they find out Eve could recover some or all of bits of the key) they cannot
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change the key unless they have a secure channel or meet each other. A solution to the
key establishment problem has been suggested for the first time by Diffie & Hellman
(1976). This situation which is shown in Figure 1.4 makes use of the difficulty of solving
the DLP. It is assumed that Alice and Bob have already selected an elliptic curve and a
point Q on it. The order of the group of points, n, is already known .
1 Alice selects a random number 1 < r < n, computes rQ,
and sends rQ to Bob.
2 Bob selects a random number 1 < s < n, computes sQ, and
sends sQ to Bob.
3 Alice and Bob use rsQ as the common secret key for secure
communication using the private key system.
Figure 1.4: The Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol using elliptic curves.
As we see Eve’s task should be computing rsQ from rQ and sQ. If the DLP were easy
to solve Eve could find r and s by observing the communication. But she could probably
solve her problem even without solving the DLP. It is conjectured that her task is as hard
as solving the DLP but, despite numerous efforts to prove this assertion, the general case
is still open (see e.g. Maurer (1994)).
Here all required operations except finding random numbers are multiplications on
elliptic curves which shows how useful an elliptic curve co-processor can be for this
application.
Digital Signatures
As another scenario consider a situation, where Bob receives a message from Alice. For
example a message that the key has been lost and a new session key has to be established.
How can Bob be sure that this message is from Alice? Could it not be the case that Eve
wants to completely redirect Bob’s communication with Alice to herself?
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A public key protocol has been suggested by ElGamal (1985), based on which the
digital signature standard (or DSS for short) has been proposed (see FIPS PUB 186-2
(2000)). Algorithms for signing and signature verifications in elliptic curve counterparts
of this scenario (ECDSA) are shown in Algorithms 1 and 2 respectively. The function H
in these algorithms is some secure hash algorithm (FIPS recommends SHA); we do not
discuss security of hash functions here. For us at the moment, it is a function that takes a
sequence of bits and outputs a sequence of fixed length, say 160 bits, with some specific
properties (see FIPS PUB 180-1 (1993) for more information).
Algorithm 1 Message signing in ECDSA
Input: An elliptic curve with a fixed point Q on it, together with its order n, the private
key 1 < d < n− 1, the public key R = dQ, and the message m to be signed.
Output: The pair of integers (r, s) as the signature of the message m.
1: Select a random integer 1 < k < n− 1
2: Compute kQ = (x1, y1) and r = x1 mod n
3: if r = 0 then
4: Go to 1
5: end if
6: Compute k−1 mod n
7: Compute s = k−1(H(m) + dr) mod n
8: if s = 0 then
9: Go to 1
10: end if
11: return (r, s)
Here we see that the key generation has one elliptic curve multiplication and the sign-
ing and verification phases require one and two multiplications respectively. These are
operations which can be accelerated using elliptic curve co-processors.
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Algorithm 2 Signature verification in ECDSA.
Input: An elliptic curve with a fixed point Q on it, together with its order n, the public
key R = dQ, the message m which is signed, and a pair of integers (r, s) as the
signature.
Output: TRUE if (r, s) is a valid signature for m, FALSE otherwise.
1: Compute c = s−1 mod n and H(m)
2: Compute u1 = H(m) · c mod n and u2 = r · c mod n
3: Compute u1Q + u2R = (x0, y0) and v = x0 mod n





1.3 Hardware for Cryptography
In the last section we saw where elliptic curve cryptography can be used. But is it really
necessary to build a special co-processor for it or all of our problems can be solved using
current processors to perform algorithms? In this section we consider two special cases
where co-processors can have important advantages which can not be achieved by only
using general purpose microprocessors.
1.3.1 Smart Cards
Smart cards are going to be a part of our life. A lot of our applications are done using smart
cards. Identifying ourselves in a mobile network is done using SIM cards (Subscriber
Identity Module). We use smart cards as insurance cards, bank cards, and in several other
applications. These are some chips with limited amounts of memory and small general
purpose processors. Implementations of cryptographic algorithms on these processors
are generally slow and require several operations but can be reduced to fewer ones when
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special purpose co-processors are used. These reductions save energy and time.
Another possibility is to extend the smart card microprocessor with some special arith-
metic modules. Results which are gathered in this project can be used in each of these
strategies.
1.3.2 Accelerator Cards
Another situation where a crypto co-processor can be useful is in e-commerce servers. In
these applications the computational power is not so limited as in smart cards but there are
several requests which should be responded to simultaneously. In an e-commerce server
several users try to connect to a server and send requests for which a signature must be
generated or verified. At the same time users, who are already connected, send and re-
ceive information which should be encrypted. The processor is here not only responsible
for cryptographic algorithms but it should also process some other tasks like network
operations which are assigned to every server. Equipping a server with a cryptography
accelerator card will help the main microprocessor to concentrate on server operations.
Otherwise each user would face a long waiting delay for his jobs to be done.
1.3.3 FPGA
FPGAs or field programmable gate arrays are valuable tools which can help in several
design stages. On the one hand an FPGA module can be used to develop a prototyping
model. Developing an ASIC chip is very expensive because once a design is finished,
changing its structure requires a completely new chip. FPGAs give designers the oppor-
tunity to test the complete hardware (up to some timing limitations) for possible bugs and
problems.
On the other hand with the development of large and inexpensive FPGAs it is possible
to design the complete system in a single chip (an SoC, or a system on chip). These
systems perform all necessary operations and can be reconfigured at any time. A system
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Block SelectRAM CLB
Figure 1.5: A simplified version of a Virtex-II FPGA
which is developed and encounters a problem needs only to be reconfigured to solve the
problem. For our example with the accelerator card it is possible to make the co-processor
on an FPGA and modify it with respect to the workload during the operation.
The designs explained later, in Chapters 2 and 3, are implemented on the FPGAs from
Xilinx company. A simplified overview of the structure of an FPGA in the Virtex II family,
on which the designs are implemented, is shown in Figure 1.5. For complete information
about these FPGAs see the online documentation on the internet (Xilinx 2005). There
are several modules on such an FPGA, but we mention here only two of them which are
important in our designs.
Block SelectRAM memory modules provide large 18 Kbit storage elements of dual-
port RAM. These modules can be separately read and written by two processor modules
and can be especially used as interfaces between processors and co-processors.
The Virtex-II configurable logic blocks (CLBs) are organized in an array and are used
to build combinational and synchronous logic designs. Each CLB element is tied to a











Figure 1.6: A simplified view of a single slice in a CLB of a Virtex-II FPGA
switch matrix to access the general routing matrix. A CLB element comprises 4 similar
slices, with fast local feedbacks within the CLB. There are also fast connections between
each CLB and its neighbors. Each slice includes several parts from which the most im-
portant ones for our designs are: two 4-input function generators, two single-bit D-type
registers, and two multiplexers. The arrangement of these parts is shown in Figure 1.6.
In this figure look-up tables (LUTs) are 4-input modules which have a single-bit output.
These LUTs are each capable of implementing any arbitrarily defined boolean function
of four inputs. The output of each LUT goes to the multiplexer and the register. The
multiplexer selects, whether the LUT or the register should be connected to the output of
the slice. This configuration is helpful when designing pipelined circuits.
1.3.4 Circuit Parameters
The cost parameters which we use to compare different designs are the implementation
areas and the times required for the computation of results. We do not consider energy
efficient implementation techniques and do not use the consumed energy as a cost func-
tion. The area of a combinational circuit – a circuit containing no memory element – is
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expressed as the number of two-input gates. In FPGA-based circuits this parameter can
be compared with the number of LUTs since these blocks are responsible for the imple-
mentation of boolean functions in FPGAs. However, most of our designs use memory
elements and are sequential. The pipelined multipliers in Chapter 3 especially use regis-
ters of the slices. To make a fair comparison between two different circuits in the case
of sequential circuits, i.e., when timing and memory elements are important, we use the
number of slices for the comparisons. In this way we count both the number of boolean
function gates and the bit-registers.
The time parameter of a combinational circuit is computed as the depth of the circuit.
This is the minimum allowable clock period, when this circuit is used without any further
modifications. For the FPGA-based implementations it is better to compute the time cost
as the product of the number of the clock cycles by the minimum allowable clock period.
The latter contains several parameters like the propagation delays of cascaded LUTs,
delay of routing resources including buffers in high fan-out nets, and setup times of the
registers. For the case of two-input gate model the number of gates in the longest path
represents the time cost.
The best method to compare two circuits is to analyze their area and time costs in-
dividually. But in some situations one parameter is more important (or more expensive)
than the other. For example in a very small FPGA a much faster implementation which
does not fit on the FPGA is of no use. Here the fair measure of comparison, which is
also well established in the literature, is the product of area by time or AT. We use this
measure to compare circuits when there is a conflict between the two parameters. The
area-time measure has also another property which can be used for the comparison of
parallel implementations of a method. Considering a circuit to be a parallel algorithm the
area-time measure can be thought of as the consumed energy of that algorithm. Here the
area is the sum of the power of processors which will be dissipated in the computation
time. The energy of an ideal parallel implementation should be equal to that of a serial
implementation, but there is often a penalty factor due to the parallelism. This measure






Figure 1.7: Using the raptor card as an ECDSA co-processor
shows how good different parallel implementations of a serial algorithm are.
1.3.5 A Typical Scenario, ECDSA Accelerator Card
As a typical scenario we have used our FPGA-based implementation to be on a PCI
card in a PC. The system was designed to be JAVA compatible and developed in such
a way that a programmer can access the processor functionalities through JAVA libraries.
The platform which we used was the Rapid prototyping platform (Raptor card) from the
working group AGRu¨ckert in the university of Paderborn. In the next section we describe
the specifications of the system.
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Digital Signatures in JAVA
The communication between JAVA applications and the ECCo is shown in
Figure 1.7. The JAVA application starts by instantiating two objects of type
ECDSAKeyPairGenerator and ECDSASignature which are derived from
DSAKeyPairGenerator and DSASignature in the JAVA security provider respec-
tively.
The class DSAKeyPairGenerator is a placeholder for classes which generate a
set of public and private keys once a security parameter (generally the key length) and the
algorithm are specified. In our implementation the security parameter, which specifies
the extension degree of the finite field, can be only 191. To use other parameters the co-
processor has to be synthesized again ,while the generation of the required VHDL-codes
can be done automatically. The generated key pair is returned in a structure which is
already defined by JAVA.
The class DSASignature contains virtual definitions of the necessary operations to
perform digital signature algorithm, namely signing and verifying the signature. Again
parameter passing is done in a standard way predefined by JAVA.
As we have already said these two classes contain only empty operations which have
to be implemented for a cryptography system in JAVA. Our implementations perform the
operations according to Algorithms 1 and 2. For the generation of a key pair only one
multiplication over the elliptic curve is required which is done using the co-processor.
There are several other operations like generation of random numbers, long integer arith-
metic, and computing the SHA. These are performed using internal implementations of
JAVA.
The security objects which we have implemented communicate with the card through
Java Native Interface (or JNI). JNI is a facility which is put into JAVA systems to enable
them to access libraries in other languages like the C language.
The driver for the card which is developed in the working group AGTeich of the Uni-
versity of Paderborn is able to get a 191-bit integer and a point Q, start the card to perform
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Finite field F2191




Number of points 156927543384667019095894735583461499581
5261150867795429199 · 4
Key generation time 3.6 ms
Signing time 3 ms
Verification time 4 ms
Table 1.8: The specifications of our PCI based ECDSA co-processor with the timings
achieved on a XCV2000e FPGA when the clock frequency is 12.5 MHz.
the point multiplication, and return the result. This driver which has been developed using
C++ is a part of the system and is accessed through the JNI.
Some information about our design is shown in Table 1.8. In this table the parameter
b is the hexadecimal representation of that element in F2191 . The best software based time
known to us is about 3.5 ms using a 900 MHz UltraSPARC III processor 3 (see Gupta
et al. (2004)). We know of no hardware implementation of ECDSA. The performance
of our ECDSA co-processor can be increased by implementing long integer arithmetic
in FPGA instead of using the JAVA inherent libraries. As it can be seen this system is
fairly fast even with a very slow clock frequency. Embedding such a design in a handheld
device can result in energy saving which is an important parameter.
3The time is not accurate since it has been visually interpolated from a continuous curve.
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1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, elliptic curve cryptography, the structure of FPGAs, and the parameters
used to compare different hardware designs were briefly reviewed. The structure of a test
elliptic curve digital signature (ECDSA) co-processor using an XCV2000e FPGA, has
also been studied and the benchmarks have been presented.
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Chapter 2
An FPGA-Based Elliptic Curve
Cryptography Co-Processor
2.1 Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptosystems are public key protocols whose security is based on the con-
jectured difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem on an elliptic curve.
Assuming Q to be a point of order n on an elliptic curve it is desirable to compute
mQ, where m is an integer smaller than n. This will be done by using several additions,
doublings, or possibly negations of points on the elliptic curve to achieve the result. These
operations boil down to arithmetic operations in the finite field K = Fqn , over which
the elliptic curve has been defined. In this work we concentrate on fields which have
characteristic 2, i.e., q is a power of 2.
The required computations to compute mQ can be categorized at three levels. Each
requires thorough investigations to enable the design of a high performance elliptic curve
co-processor (see Figure 2.1):
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Scalar multiplication
Point addition and doubling
Finite field arithmetic
Figure 2.1: Three stages of performing elliptic curve point multiplication.
• Scalar multiplication: By scalar multiplication or point multiplication we mean
the combination of additions and doublings of points to compute mQ for given m
and Q. There are several methods like the additive variant of repeated squaring
or addition-subtraction chains which do this task using O(logm) doublings and
additions (see Knuth (1998) and Morain & Olivos (1990)).
• Point addition and doubling: Multiplication of a point by a scalar consists of
several additions, doublings, and possibly negations of points on the elliptic curve.
Negation or computing −Q is almost free of cost but the other two operations are
more expensive. There are several representations of points of an elliptic curve
which influence point addition and doubling costs depending on the platform used.
• Finite field arithmetic: Point coordinates which have to be processed during point
additions and doublings are elements of a finite field K. By accelerating opera-
tions in this field, we can improve the efficiency of point arithmetic and as an effect
increase the performance of the co-processor. This can be done by optimal selec-
tion of finite field representations and by the hardware structures which perform
addition, multiplication, and division in the field.
There are several published reports of efficient implementations of elliptic curve co-
processors. see Gao et al. (1999), Gregory et al. (1999), Leong & Leung (2002), Orlando
& Paar (1999), and Lutz & Hasan (2004)). The distinguishing factor in our work is the
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application of parallelism in both bit and finite field operations. Unfortunately the perfor-
mance of the FPGA-based systems depends on the platforms and a direct comparison is
possible only when the same target is used. Lutz & Hasan (2004) implemented their co-
processor on the same FPGA model as used in this project. Their system requires 0.233
ms for a point multiplication on a generic curve over F2163 when the clock frequency is
66 MHz. The current design on the other hand requires 0.18 ms for a generic curve over
F2191 with the same clock frequency and on the same FPGA. It should be pointed out that
their design is optimized for Koblitz curves (see Hankerson et al. (2003)) and not generic
curves.
This chapter is arranged in the following manner: Section 2.2 compares two popu-
lar finite field representations, namely the polynomial basis and the normal basis for the
efficiency of arithmetic, when elliptic curves are implemented. Section 2.3 compares dif-
ferent representations of points and their effect on the efficiency when parallel and serial
implementations are considered. Section 2.4 compares different methods of computing
an integer multiple of a point. Section 2.5 presents the data-path and important modules
in the implemented FPGA-based co-processor followed by the benchmarks achieved in
Section 2.6. Finally Section 2.7 summarizes the results of the previous sections. Some
of the materials of this chapter have been already published in Bednara et al. (2002a) and
Bednara et al. (2002b).
2.2 Finite Field Arithmetic
It is known that the additive group of a finite field Fqn can be represented as a vector space
of degree n over Fq. In this manner elements of F2n are represented by vectors of length
n consisting of 0’s and 1’s which can be added using XOR operations. The operations of
multiplication, squaring, and inversion depend highly on the selected basis.
There are three famous finite field representations, namely: polynomial, normal, and
dual bases. Arithmetic in dual bases requires a change of representation for each oper-
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ation. This makes these bases inefficient for cryptographic purposes because the finite
fields which are used here are of significant size and conversion would be inefficient. We
consider only the two other bases in this section.
2.2.1 Polynomial and Normal Bases
One popular representation for finite fields is the polynomial basis. A polynomial basis of
F2n is a basis of the form (1, ω, ω2, · · · , ωn−1), where ω is a root of an irreducible poly-
nomial f(x) of degree n over F2. In this basis elements of the finite field are represented
by polynomials of degree smaller than n and operations are done by means of polynomial
arithmetic modulo f(x).
Another representation for finite fields is the normal basis representation. Here a basis
of the form (α, α2, · · · , α2n−1) is used for the finite field F2n . It is easily verifiable that
squaring in this basis can be done using only a circular shift. Multiplication in this basis
is more complicated than in the polynomial basis. Further information about finite fields
and bases can be found in several books, e.g., McEliece (1987).
2.2.2 Multiplication
Multiplication and inversion are the most resource consuming operations in elliptic curve
cryptography. However, although inversion requires more space and time than multipli-
cation it is possible to use a single inversion for the whole scalar multiplication by means
of appropriate point representations. It is also imperative to optimize the multiplication
algorithms.
Finite field multipliers, depending on the generated bits per clock cycle, can be grouped
into the three categories of serial, parallel, and serial-parallel multipliers. The general
structure of a finite field multiplier for F2n , together with the timings of the three groups
are shown in Figure 2.2.
We consider only parallel-in multipliers, meaning that the bits of the representations
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clock: · · ·
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clock: · · ·




Figure 2.2: (a) The general structure of F2n multipliers, together with the timing dia-
grams of (b) serial, (c) parallel, and (d) serial-parallel multipliers of word-length w. The
elements α and β are multiplied to get their product, γ.
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of inputs are simultaneously loaded into the multiplier. This requires that each of the input
buses be n-bits wide. The clock signal, like other sequential designs, specifies the timing.
The rising edge of each clock cycle defines the beginning of one time-interval. The period
of the clock signal cannot be arbitrarily short. To see why consider the multiplier block
which contains both logic elements and flip-flops. When the inputs of a path, which
consists of logic elements only, are applied there is some time needed for its output to
be valid and the inputs should remain constant over this time. There is also the settling-
time requirement. The settling-time is the time during which the input-pin of a flip-flop
must remain stable before the sample-pin of the flip-flop is deactivated. The clock period
should not be shorter than the sum of these times. We refer to this sum by the “delay”
or the “minimum clock-period”. Obviously the multiplication time is the product of the
number of clock cycles and this delay.
Figure 2.2-b shows the timing of a serial multiplier. A serial multiplier generates each
of the output bits in one clock cycle, hence it requires n clock cycles for a multiplication in
F2n . The sequence of output bits, cτ(0), cτ(1), · · · , cτ(n−1), i.e., the bits of the representation
of the product γ can have the same or the reverse ordering as c0, c1, · · · , cn−1.
Parallel multipliers, whose timing is shown in Figure 2.2-c, generate all of the output
bits in a single clock cycle. The output-bus is in this case n-bits wide. The serial-parallel
multipliers fill the gap between the serial and the parallel multipliers. They generate
w > 1 bits of output in each clock cycle1. These sets of w bits are shown as C0, C1,
· · · , Cm−1 in Figure 2.2-d. The parameter w is henceforth referred to by “word-length”.
A serial-parallel multiplier of word-length w performs a multiplication in F2n in dn/we
clock cycles.
It should be mentioned that there are other parallel multipliers which require k cycles
to compute the result, but in this time other data can be fed to them to be processed. We
1Each serial multiplier can also be considered as a special case of serial-parallel with w = 1. The reason
for the separation of these two concepts in this text is that there are arithmetic methods which are serial but
do not possess any direct serial-parallel implementation.
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categorize them depending on their application. If they are pipelined multipliers and there
are several input values to be fed into these multipliers sequentially we group them as
parallel multipliers. The reason is that the multiplication of t values in this case requires
m + t − 1 cycles. The parameter t becomes insignificant for large values of m and
effectively only one clock cycle has been used. If on the other hand no new input can be
loaded during the multiplication, either due to the structure of the multiplier or because
there are not enough input-data available, we assume the multiplier to be serial-parallel.
In all of these cases the multiplication time is the minimum clock-period times the number
of clock cycles. Parallel multipliers are generally characterized by large area and delays.
They are used for small input lengths. Serial multipliers allow smaller area and shorter
delays. They are used when there is only a limited amount of area on the chip.
In this section we discuss only multipliers with low number of bits per clock cycle,
i.e., we assume that many clock cycles are required for a single multiplication. Some
parallel multipliers will be studied in the next two chapters. The multipliers which we
analyze in this section are linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and Massey-Omura (MO)
multipliers. These are the two most popular serial-parallel units for polynomial and nor-
mal bases respectively. We analyze and compare them in the following three models to
reflect different abstraction levels of a circuit (See Bednara et al. (2002a) and Bednara
et al. (2002b)).
• Theoretical 2-input gate: This is the most popular model in the literature. It is
very well suited to analyze the gate complexity of ASIC or VLSI based hardware
modules. But its time analysis results are inaccurate especially in FPGAs, since
they do not reflect the delay of buffers used in high fan-out paths or routing elements
which are used in FPGAs.
• FPGA 4-input LUT model: This is a more practical abstraction of many FPGA
based circuits. This model does not only compute the number of 4-input units
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(like LUTs2) but also estimates the propagation delays corresponding to buffers in
high fan-out nets. These results can be extracted from the timing analyzer before
running the “Place and Route” (par) program. This program is the final part during
the synthesization of a circuit for FPGA implementation. When every block of the
hardware design is converted to segments which exist on the FPGA and a net-list
is generated, this program finds the appropriate positions and connections on the
target FPGA and generates a binary configuration file (the bitstream file) which can
be downloaded onto the FPGA.
• FPGA model: This description of the circuit contains real gate and time complex-
ities of the circuit when implemented on the platform FPGA. Space complexity
is computed as the number of used slices and timing complexity as the minimum
allowable period for the clock signal across the circuit multiplied by the number
of clock cycles required to compute the result. The clock period depends on the
propagation delay which contains delays of logic elements, high fan-out buffers,
and routing resources. The costs in this model will generally depend on the imple-
mented circuit which will not be unique due to the used nondeterministic place and
route algorithms. To achieve more convergent results we set tight timing constraints
for “par”.
2-input Gate Model
The LFSR multiplier is best known because of its simplicity to perform finite field multi-
plication in polynomial basis. It generates, in its simplest form, a single bit of output in
each clock cycle, but can be easily extended to a serial-parallel multiplier. A schematic
diagram of such a multiplier for F2n is shown in Figure 2.3. In this figure m = d nwe,





















Figure 2.3: Schematic diagram of a serial-parallel LFSR multiplier
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At the beginning the polynomials a(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 aix











where each Aj and Bj are polynomials of degree smaller than w. The word multipliers
M multiply the highest word of the register B by the words of A. The Overlap circuit adds
the coefficients of common powers with each other. In each clock cycle the registers B
and C will be shifted to right by w bits, which is equivalent to multiplying by xw. During
shifting C to right, some powers of x will be generated which are greater than or equal
to n and should be converted to their representation in the polynomial basis. This will
be accomplished by the feedback circuit which hardwires these to smaller powers of x
according to the polynomial basis representation of xi for n ≤ i < n + w. The product
of a(x) and Bk is a polynomial of degree n + w − 2 which is again larger than n − 1
when w > 1. We call the action of converting the produced powers which are greater
than n − 1 into the polynomial basis P “Feed forwarding”. This task will also be done
using the “Feedback circuit”. Theorem 1 states the space and time complexities of this
multiplier.
Theorem 1. Let P be a polynomial basis for F2n generated by the irreducible polynomial
f(x) ∈ F2[x]. In an LFSR multiplier of word length w for P the required number of AND
gates is mw2 and the number of XOR gates is




Here m = d n
w
e and H(xi) is the Hamming weight, or the number of nonzero coefficients,
in the representation of xi in the basis P.
Proof. Each of the m word multipliers require w2 AND and (w − 1)2 XOR gates. The
ith word multiplier computes the powers xw(i−1) to xw(i−1)+2w−2. Hence, the ith & the
(i+ 1)st multipliers have w − 1 common coefficients. There are m− 1 overlap modules
which require in total (m − 1)(w − 1) XOR gates. Output bits of the overlap circuit can
be categorized into two groups, namely the powers smaller than n and the powers which
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are greater than or equal to n. Adding the first group to the contents of memory cells
during shifting in the register C requires n− 1 XOR gates (the constant coefficient has no
neighbor on the left side and requires no addition). But the other group should be com-




XOR gates. Finally the feedback circuit has to increment the register values by the poly-
nomial basis representation of the high powers of x generated by shift to right. It requires∑w+n−1
i=n H(x
i) XOR gates. Table 2.4 summarizes these results.
Module AND gates XOR gates
Word multipliers mw2 m(w − 1)2
Overlap circuit 0 (m− 1)(w − 1)
Overlap circuit
to register C
x0 · · ·xn−1 0 n− 1








Table 2.4: Number of gates in a serial-parallel LFSR multiplier.
The propagation delay depends on the distribution of ones in the polynomial f(x). If
representations of no two different powers xi and xj for n ≤ i, j < n + w have the same
nonzero coefficients, the feedback circuit will contribute to an increment of at most two
gates. One for the power generated by the shifting and one from the parallel multipliers.




, where si is an ascending sequence
of positive numbers, this happens if w < s1. For example for the two cases that the
irreducible polynomials are trinomials and pentanomials r = 2, 4, respectively. The next
corollary computes the area and time complexities of the LFSR multiplier for small values
of w.
36 Chapter 2- FPGA-based Co-processor





, where si < sj if i < j. If the word length w is smaller than s1 then the
area and minimum clock periods of an LFSR multiplier in this basis are given by




 TA + 2TX if w = 1, andTA + (3 + dlog2(w)e)TX if w > 1
respectively. Here TA is the delay of an AND gate, and TX is the delay of an XOR gate.
Proof. The area complexity (case i) can be computed by setting H(xi) to r in Theorem 1.
To compute the minimum clock period in case ii we observe that each parallel multiplier
has a delay of TA+ dlog2(w)eTX . The overlap circuit, shift register adders, and feedback
circuit, according to what already mentioned for the case w < s1, result in a delay of 2TX
for w = 1 and 3TX if w > 1 (there is no overlap circuit if w = 1).
It is also known that in a finite field F2n , in which an optimal normal basis of type 2
exists, a Massey-Omura multiplier of word length w requires wn and w(2n− 2) gates of
types AND & XOR respectively and has a propagation delay of TA+(1+dlog2(n−1)e)TX
(See Koc¸ & Sunar (1998)).
A comparison of the two multipliers in the 2-input gate model for F2191 is shown in
Figure 2.5. Here the computation time, as the product of the number of clock cycles by
the minimum clock-period, as a function of required area is plotted. Values are computed
for different word lengths w. The polynomial basis P is generated using the irreducible
polynomial x191 + x9 + 1 and F2191 contains an optimal normal basis of type 2. As it can
be seen the LFSR multiplier is dominant in all practical operating points.
Table 2.6 displays the comparison of the two multipliers in the 4-input LUT and FPGA
models3. The area in these two models are equal and the minimum clock-periods are
shown in the second and third columns for each multiplier respectively. It can be seen
3A Massey-Omura multiplier for w = 96 does not fit on our FPGA and no delay can be computed.
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Figure 2.5: Time versus Area comparison of LFSR and Massey-Omura multipliers in
F2191
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from Table 2.6, that the delay grows faster than estimated when the multiplier gets larger.
An effect which is caused by the routing resources.
Bits per LFSR Massey-Omura
clock Slice Delay (ns) Delay (ns) Slice Delay (ns) Delay (ns)
(4-input LUT) (actual) (4-input LUT) (actual)
1 288 1.577 3.136 397 7.506 9.847
2 383 2.116 4.295 509 7.506 10.619
4 436 3.194 4.967 730 7.506 12.670
8 762 3.733 6.278 1172 7.506 15.666
16 1513 4.811 11.554 2052 7.506 18.403
32 2558 5.889 15.423 3814 7.506 16.568
48 3642 8.584 21.745 5584 7.506 26.720
64 4712 7.506 22.419 7347 7.506 26.886
96 6837 7.506 27.846 10847 – –
Table 2.6: Comparing the LFSR and Massey-Omura multipliers in F2191 implemented
on a XCV2000e FPGA. Delays are the minimum clock period in nano-seconds for the
4-input LUT model and the actual FPGA implementations respectively.
2.2.3 Squaring
Another important operation in elliptic curve cryptography is the squaring. It can be done
more efficiently than multiplication. For comparison we consider again two different
cases of normal and polynomial bases.
Normal Bases
Squaring an element which is represented in normal basis requires only a cyclic shift of
the corresponding vector. We assume the space and time complexities of this operation to
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2-input gate 4-input LUT FPGA model
Space Delay Space Delay Space Delay
95 2TX 91 6.477ns 91 8.012ns
Table 2.7: Space and time complexities of squaring in F2191 using three different models.
be 0.
Polynomial Bases
Computing the square of a polynomial over F2 can be easily done by inserting zeros
between each two adjacent coefficients. The resulting polynomial should then be reduced
modulo the irreducible polynomial characterizing the basis. Some upper bounds for the
space and time complexities are reported in Wu (2000). If the irreducible polynomial
is of the form f(x) = xn + xk + 1 and k < n
2
, then reducing a general polynomial of
degree 2n− 2 modulo f(x) can be done using a circuit with at most 2(n− 1) XOR gates.
The depth of the circuit would be at most 2TX . Figure 2.8 shows the circuit to perform
squaring in F2191 . In this figure the circles in the ith column show the input coefficients
which must be added to compute the ith output-bit. For example the circles in the gray
box show that the coefficient of x in the resulting polynomial is the sum of a96 (for x192)
and a187 (for x374). Here the circles in the first row are the low-order coefficients a0 to a95
of the original polynomial corresponding with the powers 1 to x190.
This kind of squarer is especially attractive for FPGA based circuits where the struc-
ture of circuits can be modified in each design depending on the selected finite field. For
the case of F2191 we have used the trinomial x191 + x9 + 1 to represent the finite field.
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Figure 2.8: The Distribution of additions for squaring in F2191 in the polynomial basis generated by x191 + x9 + 1
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2.2.4 Inversion
There are generally two different methods for inversion in finite fields, namely the Euclid-
ean algorithm and Fermat’s theorem. Classical Euclidean algorithm requires one polyno-
mial division and two multiplications in each stage. There are at most n stages to compute
the inverses in F2n . This fact makes it inefficient for hardware implementations. Instead
the binary Euclidean method is often used where only addition of polynomials is required
(see Guo & Wang (1998), Takagi (1998), and Shantz (2001)). The binary Euclidean al-
gorithm requires in the worst case 2n clocks which cannot be reduced using more space.
We use here the second method which is based on the fact that:
x2
n−2 = x−1 (2.1)
for any element x ∈ F×2n . To compute the (2n − 2)th power of an element we use the
method by Asano et al. (1989) and von zur Gathen & No¨cker (2003). Application of
this method to F2191 can be summarized as represented in Figure 2.9. As can be seen
an inversion requires 10 multiplications and 190 squarings independent of the finite field
representation.
2.3 Point Addition and Doubling
Point arithmetic is another building block for multiplication in elliptic curves. As it is
mentioned in Chapter 1, points on an elliptic curve together with the point at infinity O
form an abelian group. There have been different proposals for point representations.
Each of them has its own advantages and drawbacks and some of them are suitable for
special implementation platforms. For a detailed survey of different representations in
prime finite fields see Cohen et al. (1998); Lo´pez & Dahab (1999a) give a survey for
binary finite fields. We review such representations and their resource consumptions for
parallel implementations. Most of these works are already cited in Bednara et al. (2002a)
and Bednara et al. (2002b). In our analysis we count only the number of inversions and
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0: y1 ← x {x2
1−1}
1: y2 ← y21 · y1 {x2
2−1}
2: y3 ← y22 · y1 {x2
3−1}
3: y5 ← y2
2
3 · y2 {x
25−1}
4: y10 ← y2
5
5 · y5 {x
210−1}
5: y20 ← y2
10
10 · y10 {x
220−1}
6: y40 ← y2
20
20 · y20 {x
240−1}
7: y80 ← y2
40
40 · y40 {x
280−1}
8: y85 ← y2
5
80 · y5 {x
285−1}
9: y95 ← y2
10
85 · y10 {x
295−1}
10: y190 ← y2
95
95 · y95 {x
2190−1}
11: Output← y2190 {x2
191−2}
Figure 2.9: Sequence of multiplications and squarings for inversion in F2191
multiplications because of their higher costs compared to addition and squaring in FPGA
designs.
Parallel implementations are interesting both from hardware and software point of
views. It is shown in Section 2.2.2 that multiplication costs grow faster than linear when
the word length is increased. In hardware designs, this suggests breaking up large multi-
pliers into as many parallel multipliers4 as possible. Efficient arithmetic with processors
which contain several ALUs like C6000 DSP series requires parallel algorithms to be
developed. This would be also advantageous for better use of pipeline stages in RISC
processors (see Hennesy & Patterson (2003)). An analysis of possible parallelism for
some special types of finite fields has been already described by Smart (2001). We con-
sider here again only fields of characteristic 2 since they are more suitable for hardware
implementations.
4We assume efficient communication inside the FPGA.
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2.3.1 Simple Representations
Possibly the most straightforward representation of points on elliptic curves is the affine
representation from which other representations can be derived. Here every point is
specified using two coordinates x and y. We consider the general equation of a non-
supersingular elliptic curve over a field of characteristic 2 according to Blake et al. (1999),
namely:
y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b.
Two different points Q1 = (x1, y1) and Q2 = (x2, y2) can be added to result in a third






2 + λ+ x1 + x2 + a, (2.2)
y3 = (x1 + x3)λ+ x3 + y1.
The sum of two different points if the sum of their x-coordinates is 0 is the point at infinity,
or O.










y4 = (x1 + x4)λ+ x4 + y1.
If x1 = 0 then Q4 will be the point at infinity.
As can be seen, each of the addition or doubling operations requires 1 inversion, 2
multiplications, and 1 squaring or 1 division, 1 multiplication, and 1 squaring. We denote
this cost by 1I + 2M since the costs of addition and squaring in the field are negligible.
The second multiplication in each of these relations depends on the first one and they
cannot be performed in parallel.
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Representation Mappings Addition Doubling
x y costs depth costs depth
Jacobian (J) X/Z2 Y/Z3 16M 4M 5M 2M
Lo´pez/Dahab (L) X/Z Y/Z2 13M 4M 4M 2M
Table 2.10: Some elliptic curve point representations with their corresponding costs.
A possibility to avoid inversion in each point addition and doubling is to use a projec-
tive point representation. In this case x and y from the affine representation are substituted
by X/Zm and Y/Zn for some specific values of m and n which result in different projec-
tive representations. All points (αX, αY, αZ) for α 6= 0 belong to the same equivalence
class which is represented by (X : Y : Z). Setting the Z-coordinate equal to 1 results
in the same X and Y coordinates as the corresponding affine representation. The point at
infinity will be the equivalence class (0 : 1 : 0). Here we consider the most popular Ja-
cobian and the most efficient Lo´pez-Dahab representations. Table 2.10 summarizes these
representations, their costs, and the length of the longest computation path when a parallel
implementation is used. It should be mentioned that the Jacobian addition can be done
with fewer multiplications, but that implementation has larger depth and is not efficient
for parallel implementation. Data dependency diagrams for some of these representations
are shown in Figures 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14.
2.3.2 Mixed Representations
Mixed representations for elliptic curves have been independently published by Cohen
et al. (1998) and Lo´pez & Dahab (1999b) for prime and binary finite fields respectively.
Indeed the work by Cohen et al. (1998) is more general and can be applied to simple
double-and-add and addition-subtraction chains as well as other sophisticated methods
like Brauer methods (see Brauer (1939)). Because of memory limitations in FPGA cir-
cuits we do not consider windowing methods and discuss parallel implementation of the
method by Lo´pez & Dahab (1999b) only.



















































































































(v + Z3) + v(v
2 + Z2
3
) + u2(u2Z1Z2 + r)
Figure 2.11: Data dependency of parallel implementation of point addition in Jacobian
representation
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Figure 2.12: Data dependency of parallel implementation of point doubling in Jacobin
representation
Representation Addition Doubling
costs depth costs depth
Mixed Jacobian (J) 12M 4M 5M 2M
Mixed Lo´pez/Dahab (L) 10M 4M 4M 2M
Table 2.15: Addition and doubling costs for mixed representation arithmetic over elliptic
curves.
The mixed Lo´pez-Dahab and mixed Jacobian addition methods are other kinds of
projective additions in which the Z coordinate of one of the points is set to 1. In this
way some multiplications and squarings can be saved resulting in new addition formulas
which are shown in Figures 2.16 and 2.17. The new costs are shown in Table 2.15.
2.4 Scalar Multiplication
Scalar multiplication or the task of computing mQ, for a given integer m and a point Q,
consists of many additions, doublings, and possibly negations which must be combined
together. The selected method to perform these simpler operations depends on several
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r = v2(p + aw2), X3 = u
2 + up + r, s = v2Y2Z
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Y3 = ups+ tZ3
Figure 2.13: Data dependency of parallel implementation of point addition in
Lo´pez/Dahab representation
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Figure 2.14: Data dependency of parallel implementation of point doubling in
Lo´pez/Dahab representation
parameters like the point arithmetic costs and the amount of available memory (for pre-
computation and intermediate results). FPGAs have only limited amount of memory, and
these memory blocks (see Block SelectRAM in Section 1.3) are distributed across the
FPGA. Accessing these memory cells is one of the slowest operations inside FPGAs.
Hence, we limit our study to methods which do not require precomputations.
There are three methods which can be applied here: The “double and add” and the
“addition-subtraction chains” methods which are thoroughly investigated in the litera-
ture (see Knuth (1998), Morain & Olivos (1990), and Otto (2001)), and the Montgomery
method which is developed by Montgomery (1987). Lo´pez & Dahab (1999a) have used
the closed form formulas of point addition and doubling in affine representation to ap-
ply the method to fields of characteristic 2. The “double and add” method requires on
average n doublings and n/2 additions for multiplication of Q by a n bit random num-
ber. Addition-subtraction chains which are introduced by Morain & Olivos (1990) insert
subtractions into addition chains. These structures decrease the number of operations to
n doublings and n/3 additions on average. The Montgomery method requires exactly
n doublings and n additions for the complete multiplication, which is more than other
methods, but in each of these operations, only X and Z coordinates have to be com-

















































































(v + Z3) + v(v
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) + u2(u2Z1Z2 + r)
Figure 2.16: Data dependency of parallel implementation of mixed mode point addition
in Jacobian representation
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r = v2(p + aw2), X3 = u
2 + up + r, s = v2Y2Z
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Y3 = ups+ tZ3
Figure 2.17: Data dependency of parallel implementation of mixed mode point addition
in Lo´pez/Dahab representation















X3 = xZ3 + X1X2Z1Z2
Figure 2.18: Parallel implementation of point addition in the Montgomery method, in






















Figure 2.19: Parallel implementation of point doubling in the Montgomery method
puted. The computation of the Y coordinate is postponed to the last stage. Figure 2.4
compares the average number of required multiplications in the best method for each of
these representations. In part (a) of this figure the average number of multiplications are
compared whereas in part (b) the average number of cascaded multiplications in parallel
implementations is shown.
Data dependency diagrams for addition and doubling in the Montgomery method are
shown in Figures 2.18 and 2.19, respectively. In Figure 2.18 two points R and S are added
such that R− S = Q and x the x-coordinate of Q is already known.


















Figure 2.20: Average numbers of (a) total and (b) cascaded finite field multiplications
to multiply a point on an elliptic curve by a random scalar m, (2190 < m < 2191),
when addition-subtraction chains are used for the parallel versions of Jacobian and Lo´pez-
Dahab methods.
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2.5 FPGA-Based Co-Processor
As we have seen in Section 2.4 if precomputation is avoided the Montgomery method
results in the best performance. Based on this observation we have implemented an ECCo
(Elliptic Curve Co-processor) (see Bednara et al. (2002a) and Bednara et al. (2002b)).
There are several such implementations, see Gao et al. (1999), Orlando & Paar (2000),
and Goodman & Chandrakasan (2001) for example. The distinguishing factor in our
work is the deployment of parallel units. Because of different platform FPGAs, a direct
comparison of these implementations is not possible. But we have shown in Section 2.2.2
that parallel small multipliers (as long as parallelism is possible) would result in a better
performance than larger multipliers.
2.5.1 Data-path Architecture
The generic data-path architecture for the co-processor is shown in Figure 2.21. It is based
on the implementation of Daldrup (2002) which uses the mixed representation. Flexibility
due to finite field extension is achieved by using “generic” parameters. Modules which
could not be parameterized using VHDL structures are produced by means of code gen-
erators which are written in C++.
Modularity of the structure makes it flexible to meet various performance/area con-
straints which we describe in subsequent sections. This structure also lets prototyping
of other point representations by modifying the state machine. Particular modules of the
system are described in the following paragraphs:
• Dual port RAM
This memory stores input and output data together with the intermediate results of
computations. This module is implemented using the Block SelectRAM modules
which are briefly explained in Section 1.3. The width of its I/O buses is equal
to the extension degree n of the selected finite field F2n since it should store and
load polynomials of degrees smaller than n. One of its ports will be written by










Figure 2.21: Data-path structure.
a host processor interface module and the other one will be connected through a
multiplexer to the arithmetic modules.
• Multiplexer
There are three groups of data buses in the processor, mainly:
– input data to the dual port RAM which are also the outputs of arithmetic units,
– output data from the dual port RAM,
– and input data to the arithmetic units.
Saving and loading data to and from the dual port RAM is always time consuming.
It requires at least two clock cycles and it is sometimes more efficient to load an
arithmetic unit directly from another or the same module. The multiplexer decides
which of the first two data lines should be used to load each arithmetic module.
• Adders
This module consists of two adders, each of them having two input buffers and one
output buffer. Each input buffer requires one clock cycle to be loaded. Addition
which is only a bitwise XOR combination will be done in one clock cycle. The
code uses “generic” parameters.
2.5. FPGA-Based Co-Processor 55
• Squarers
There are two squarers which can be used in parallel. Their input-output structures
are like those of adders. They are generated using a code generator for each field
extension.
• Multipliers
As we have already seen at most two multipliers can be deployed at the same
time during the Montgomery algorithm. The multipliers are the most time and area
consuming elements in our design. They are LFSR multipliers which are generated
using a code generator. They are flexible both with respect to polynomial length
and parallelism degree. So if there is more space on the platform FPGA, the word-
length of the multipliers can be increased. But it should be taken into account that
this structure uses extra clock cycles to load and save from and into register files
and is effective as long as the multipliers require several clock cycles.
• Control module
This is probably the most complicated module in our ECCo. It controls the over-
all point multiplication and consists of several other submodules. So we devote a
complete section to it.
2.5.2 Control Module
This part is responsible for performing the Montgomery multiplication algorithm. The
required sequence of point additions and doublings of this algorithm is shown in Algo-
rithm 3 in which k = dlog2 ne. The point additions and doublings can be in any represen-
tations and the y-coordinate needs to be computed only in the last stage. We use additions
and doublings as stated in Figures 2.18 and 2.19.
This module consists of a state machine, performing Algorithm 3, which communi-
cates with several other submodules as shown in Figure 2.22. These different submodules
are described as follows:
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Algorithm 3 The Montgomery point multiplication algorithm expressed in point level.
Input: An elliptic curve with a fixed point Q on it, together with the binary representation
of the scalar multiplier m as (mk−1mk−2 . . .m1m0)2.
Output: mQ
1: Q1 ← Q, Q2 ← 2Q
2: for i from k − 2 downto 0 do
3: if mi = 1 then
4: Q1 ← Q1 + Q2, Q2 ← 2Q2
5: else




















Figure 2.22: The structure of the control module in ECCo.
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• Counter
The counter in the control module takes care of the number of iterations in Algo-
rithm 3 to be exactly dlog2 ne − 1 when n is the order of the group of points on the
elliptic curve.
• Shift register
This register will be directly loaded from the dual port RAM and contains the
multiplier m. By each repetition of Algorithm 3 this register will be shifted to
right. The LSB of this register is the decision criterion for the control module state
machine.
• Control module state machine
This state machine controls the overall operation of the processor. It starts other
modules, gives the control to them, and waits for their terminations.
• Add, Double, and Compute Y
These state machines perform the operations addition, doubling, and computing the
y-coordinate. The latter will be activated only once during the total point multipli-
cation. Each of these operations will be started with the command of the control
module state machine, which at the same time gives the control of all of the proces-
sor elements to these modules. After finishing, they activate a signal in the main
state machine which takes their control back by changing the addresses of the con-
trol line multiplexer.
• Control line multiplexer
There is a single control bus in the processor which consists of address lines for
the dual port RAM, commands to arithmetic units, and their ready status signals.
The control module state machine can change the master of this bus by activating
the corresponding address in this multiplexer.
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• Address multiplexer
As stated above there is a single control line in the processor. The point additions
and doublings in Algorithm 3 consist of the same operations which are performed
on different variables. Results should also be written back to different addresses.
This is done during an indirect addressing process. The control module state ma-
chine puts the addresses of the arguments and return values on the indirect address
line inputs of the multiplexer. The module which controls the processor can select
these addresses by activating the indirect address line on this multiplexer.
2.6 Benchmarks
Using the above structure on a XCV2000e FPGA we have performed a complete point
multiplication over F2191 in 0.18 ms using clock frequency of 66 MHz. Our finite field
multipliers generate 64 bits in one clock cycle. Since the performance of hardware im-
plementations depends on the amount of used area we can compare our results to Lutz
& Hasan (2004) only, which is on the same FPGA and the same clock frequency. Their
implementation, which is optimized for Koblitz curves, requires 0.238 ms for a point mul-
tiplication on a generic curve over F2163 . As a measure of comparison, one of the known
running times for point multiplication in software is given by Hankerson et al. (2000),
where a point multiplication in F2163 is done in 3.24 ms. Assuming a cubic growth factor
for the point multiplication (quadratic for finite field multiplications times linear for the
size of the scalar m) these hardware and software times can be extrapolated to 0.38 and
5.21 ms over our field F2191 , respectively. The above hardware implementation results are
summarized in Table 2.23.
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Implementation Multiplication time
Lutz & Hasan (2004) for F2163 0.238 ms
Extrapolating the results of Lutz & Hasan (2004) to F2191 0.38 ms
Our results for F2191 0.18 ms
Table 2.23: Comparisons of different elliptic curve scalar multiplication times on a
XCV2000e FPGA with a clock frequency of 66 MHz. To extrapolate the multiplication
time of Lutz & Hasan (2004) for F2191 we have used a cubic growth factor.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents the stages of the design and implementation of an FPGA-based
co-processor for elliptic curve cryptography. It is shown how optimizations in different
levels of finite field arithmetic, point addition and doubling, and scalar multiplication can
be combined to achieve a high performance co-processor. Here the scalar multiplication
refers to the sequence of additions and doublings which compute an integer multiplier of
a point. Finally the data-path of the designed co-processor together with the benchmarks,
when implemented on a XCV2000e FPGA are presented and compared with a published
result on a similar FPGA. The topics of this chapter are:
• Polynomial and normal bases as two popular finite field representations are com-
pared. This comparison is made for the costs of arithmetic in finite fields for the
special case of elliptic curve cryptography using generic curves. It is shown that,
especially when serial-parallel multipliers are used, polynomial bases are always
better than normal bases.
• Several point representations and their effect on the efficiency of point addition and
doubling are compared. The mixed representations of points are discussed.
• The double-and-add, addition-subtraction chains, and the Montgomery method for
point multiplication are compared. It is shown that, the Montgomery method re-
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quires fewer operations than the other two methods, since it does not compute the
y-coordinate at each iteration.
• The structure of an FPGA-based co-processor using the Montgomery method to-






As mentioned in Chapter 2, arithmetic and in particular multiplication in finite fields are
central algorithmic tasks in cryptography. The multiplication in our case, in finite fields of
characteristic 2, can be achieved by multiplying two polynomials over F2 followed by a
reduction modulo the irreducible polynomial defining the field extension. This reduction
can be done again using multiplications or very small circuits.
Classical methods for multiplying two n-bit polynomials requireO(n2) bit operations.
The Karatsuba algorithm reduces this to O(nlog2 3) (see Karatsuba & Ofman (1963)). The
Fast Fourier Transformations (FFT) with a cost of O(n logn loglog n) and the Cantor
multiplier with a cost of O(n(logn)2(loglogn)3) are efficient for high extension degrees
and therefore are not studied here for applications to cryptography (see Cantor (1989) and
von zur Gathen & Gerhard (1996)).
In this chapter hardware implementations of the Karatsuba method and its variants are
studied. Even the Karatsuba method which has the lowest crossover point with the clas-
sical algorithm is asymptotically good and thus efficient for large degrees. Sophisticated
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implementation strategies decrease the crossover point between different algorithms and
make them efficient for practical applications.
Efficient software implementations of the Karatsuba multipliers using general pur-
pose processors have been discussed thoroughly in the literature (see Paar (1994), Bailey
& Paar (1998), Koc¸ & Erdem (2002), Hankerson et al. (2003), Chapter 2, and von zur
Gathen & Gerhard (2003), Chapter 8). Hardware implementations to the contrary have
attracted less attention. Jung et al. (2002) and Weimerskirch & Paar (2003) suggest to use
algorithms with O(n2) operations to multiply polynomials which contain a prime number
of bits. Their proposed number of bit operations is by a constant factor smaller than the
classical method but asymptotically larger than those for the Karatsuba method. In Grabbe
et al. (2003a) we have proposed a hybrid implementation of the Karatsuba method which
reduces the latency by pipelining and by mixing sequential and combinational circuits.
The goal of this chapter is to decrease the resource usage of polynomial multipliers
by means of both known algorithmic and platform dependent methods. This is achieved
by computing the best choice of hybrid multiplication algorithms which multiply polyno-
mials with at most 8192 bits. This choice is restricted to six recursive methods, namely:
classical, Karatsuba, a variant of Karatsuba for quadratic polynomials, and three methods
of Montgomery (2005) for polynomials of degrees 4, 5, and 6, respectively. The “best”
refers to minimizing the area measure. This is an algorithmic and machine independent
optimization. The 240-bit multiplier of Grabbe et al. (2003a) is re-used here, which was
implemented on a XC2V6000-4FF1517-4 FPGA, to illustrate a second type of optimiza-
tion, which is machine-dependent. The goal is a 240-bit multiplier with small area-time
cost. A single 30-bit multiplier is put on the used FPGA and three Karatsuba steps are ap-
plied to get from 240 = 23·30 to 30 bits. This requires judicious application of multiplexer
and adder circuitry, but the major computational cost still resides in the 30-bit multiplier.
Twenty seven (33) small multiplications are required for one 240-bit product and these
inputs are fed into the single small multiplier in a pipelined fashion. This has the pleasant
effect of keeping the total delay small and the area reduced, with correspondingly small
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propagation delays. This 240-bit multiplier covers in particular the 233-bit polynomials
proposed by NIST for elliptic curve cryptography (FIPS PUB 186-2 (2000)).
Substantial parts of this chapter have been published in Grabbe et al. (2003a), Grabbe
et al. (2003b), von zur Gathen & Shokrollahi (2005), and von zur Gathen & Shokrollahi
(2006).
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First the Karatsuba method and its cost
are studied in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 is devoted to the optimized hybrid Karatsuba
implementations. Section 3.4 shows how a hybrid structure and pipelining can improve
resource usage in the circuit of Grabbe et al. (2003a). Section 3.5 analyzes the effect
of the number of recursion levels on the performance. Section 3.6 briefly describes the
structure of our developed code generator for the used combinational pipelined multiplier,
and finally Section 3.7 concludes this chapter.
3.2 The Karatsuba Algorithm
The three coefficients of the product (a1x + a0)(b1x+ b0) = a1b1x2 + (a1b0 + a0b1)x+
a0b0 are “classically” computed with 4 multiplications and 1 addition from the four input
coefficients a1, a0, b1, and b0. The following formula uses only 3 multiplications and 4
additions:
(a1x+ a0)(b1x+ b0) = a1b1x
2 + ((a1 + a0)(b1 + b0)− a1b1 − a0b0)x+ a0b0. (3.1)
We call this the 2-segment Karatsuba method or K2. Setting m = dn/2e, two n-bit poly-
nomials (thus of degrees less than n) can be rewritten and multiplied using the formula:
(f1x
m + f0)(g1x
m + g0) = h2x
2m + h1x
m + h0,
where f0, f1, g0, and g1 are m-bit polynomials respectively. The polynomials h0, h1, and
h2 are computed by applying the Karatsuba algorithm to the polynomials f0, f1, g0, and
g1 as single coefficients and adding coefficients of common powers of x together. This
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method can be applied recursively. The circuit to perform a single stage is shown in
Figure 3.1.
f1 f0 g1 g0






Figure 3.1: The circuit to perform one level of the Karatsuba multiplication
The “overlap circuit” adds common powers of x in the three generated products. For
example if n = 8, then the input polynomials have degree at most 7, each of the poly-
nomials f0, f1, g0, and g1 is 4 bits long and thus of degree at most 3, and their products
will be of degree at most 6. The effect of the overlap module in this case is represented in
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x10 x9 x8 x7 x6 x5 x4
x6 x5 x4 x3 x2 x1 x0
Figure 3.2: The overlap circuit for the 8-bit Karatsuba multiplier
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that we need three multiplication calls at size m = dn/2e
and some adders: 2 for input, 2 for output, and 2 for the overlap module of lengths m,
2m − 1, and m − 1 respectively. Below we consider various algorithms A of a similar
structure. We denote the size reduction factor, the number of multiplications, input adders,
output adders, and the total number of bit operations to multiply two n-bit polynomials in
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A by bA, mulA, iaA, oaA, and MA(n), respectively. Then
MA(n) = mulA M(m) + iaA m+ oaA (2m− 1) + 2(bA − 1)(m− 1), (3.2)
wherem = dn/bAe and M(m) is the cost of the multiplication call form-bit polynomials.
For A = K2, this becomes:
MK2(n) = 3 M(m) + 8m− 4, m = dn/2e.
Our interest is not the usual recursive deployment of this kind of algorithms, but rather
the efficient interaction of various methods. We include in our study the classical multi-
plication Cb on b-bit polynomials and algorithms for 3, 5, 6, and 7-segment polynomials
which we call K3 (3-segment Karatsuba, see Blahut (1985), Section 3.4, page 85), M5,
M6, and M7 (see Montgomery (2005)). The parameters of these algorithms are given in
Table 3.3.
Algorithm A bA mulA iaA oaA
K2 2 3 2 2
K3 3 6 6 6
M5 5 13 22 30
M6 6 17 61 40
M7 7 22 21 55
Cb, b ≥ 2 b b
2 0 (b− 1)2
Table 3.3: The parameters of some multiplication methods
3.3 Hybrid Design
For fast multiplication software, a judicious mixture of table look-up and classical, Karat-
suba and even faster (FFT) algorithms must be used (see von zur Gathen & Gerhard
(2003), chapter 8, and Hankerson et al. (2003), chapter 2). Suitable techniques for hard-
ware implementations are not thoroughly studied in the literature. In contrast to soft-
ware implementations where the word-length of the processor, the datapath, and the set
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of commands are fixed, hardware designers have more flexibility. In software solutions
speed and memory usage are the measures of comparison whereas hardware implementa-
tions are generally designed to minimize the area and time, simultaneously or with some
weight-factors. In this section we determine the least-cost combination of any basic rou-
tines for bit sizes up to 8192. Here, cost corresponds to the total number of operations in
software, and the area in hardware. Using pipelining and the structure of Grabbe et al.
(2003a) this can also result in multipliers which have small area-time parameters.
We present a general methodology for this purpose. We start with a toolbox T of
basic algorithms, namely T = {classical, K2, K3,M5,M6,M7}. Each A ∈ T is defined
for bA-bit polynomials. We denote by T∗ the set of all iterated (or hybrid algorithms)
compositions from T; this includes T, too.
Figure 3.4 shows the hierarchy of a hybrid algorithm for 12-bit polynomials using our
toolbox T. At the top level, K2 is used, meaning that the 12-bit input polynomials are
divided into two 6-bit polynomials each and K2 is used to multiply the input polynomi-
als as if each 6-bit polynomial were a single coefficient. K2C3 performs the three 6-bit
multiplications. One of these 6-bit multipliers is circled in Figure 3.4 and unravels as
follows:
(a5x
5 + · · ·+ a0) · (b5x
5 + · · ·+ b0) =
((a5x
2 + a4x+ a3)x
3 + (a2x
2 + a1x+ a0))
· ((b5x
2 + b4x+ b3)x
3 + (b2x
2 + b1x+ b0)) =
(A1x
3 + A0) · (B1x
3 +B0) = A1B1x
6+
((A1 + A0)(B1 +B0)− A1B1 − A0B0)x
3 + A0B0
Each of A1B1, (A1 + A0)(B1 + B0), and A0B0 denotes a multiplication of 3-bit polyno-
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mials and will be done classically using the formula
(a2x
2 + a1x+ a0)(b2x
2 + b1x+ b0) = a2b2x
4+
(a2b1 + a1b2)x
3 + (a2b0 + a1b1 + a0b2)x
2+
(a1b0 + a0b1)x+ a0b0.
Thick lines under each C3 indicate the nine 1-bit multiplications to perform C3. We
designate this algorithm, for 12-bit polynomials, with K2K2C3 = K22C3 where the left
hand algorithm, in this case K2, is the topmost algorithm.
K2
K2 K2 K2
C3 C3 C3 C3 C3 C3 C3 C3 C3
Figure 3.4: The multiplication hierarchy for K2K2C3
As in (3.2), the cost of a hybrid algorithm A2A1 ∈ T∗ with A1, A2 ∈ T∗ satisfies
MA2A1(n) ≤mulA2 MA1(m) + iaA2 m+
oaA2 (2m− 1) + 2(bA2 − 1)(m− 1), (3.3)
where MA(1) = 1 for any A ∈ T∗ and m = dn/(bA2bA1)e = ddn/bA2e/bA1e. Each
A ∈ T∗ has a well-defined input length bA, given in Table 3.3 for basic tools and by mul-
tiplication for composite methods. We extend the notion by applying A also to fewer than
bA bits, by padding with leading zeros, so that MA(m) = MA(bA) for 1 ≤ m ≤ bA. For
some purposes, one might consider the savings due to such a-priori-zero coefficients. Our
goal, however, is a pipelined structure where such a consideration cannot be incorporated.




68 Chapter 3- Sub-quadratic Multiplication
We first show that the infinitely many classical algorithms in T do not contribute to
optimal methods beyond size 12.
Lemma 3. For A ∈ T∗ and integers m ≥ 1 and b, c ≥ 2 we have the following.
(i) MCbCc(bc) = MCbc(bc).
(ii) MCbA(bAbm) ≥ MACb(bAbm).
(iii) For any n, there is an optimal hybrid algorithm all of whose components are non-
classical, except possibly the right most one.
(iv) If n ≥ 13, then Cn is not optimal.
Proof. (i) This can be easily shown using (3.2) and Table 3.3.
(ii) We only show this for A = K2. Using (3.2) and Table 3.3 we have
MCbK2(2bm)−MK2Cb(2bm) = 2(b− 1)(3bm− b− 1) > 0.
(iii) Let A = A1A2 · · ·Ar be a hybrid algorithm with A1, . . . , Ar ∈ T and suppose that
As = Cb for some s < r and b ≥ 2 and As+1 ∈ {K2, . . . ,M7}. Now (ii) shows that
the cost of
A′ = A1A2 · · ·As+1As · · ·Ar
is smaller than that of A, and A is not optimal. Hence if some As is classical, then
each At for s < t ≤ r is also classical. These can all be combined into one by (i).
(iv) We let m = dn/2e. Then
MCn(n)−MK2Cm(2m) =
2n2 − 2n+ 2− 6m2 − 2m+ 2 ≥ n2/2− 6n− 1/2 > 0
using (n + 1)/2 ≥ m and n ≥ 13. On the other hand, n ≤ 2m and the 2m-bit
algorithm K2Cm can also be used for n-bit polynomials, and we have
MK2Cm(n) ≤ MK2Cm(2m) < MCn(n).
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Algorithm 4 presents a dynamic programming algorithm which computes an optimal
hybrid algorithm from T∗ for n-bit multiplication, for n = 1, 2, . . ..
Algorithm 4 Finding optimal algorithms in T∗
Input: The toolbox T = {classical, K2, K3,M5,M6,M7} and an integer N .
Output: Table T with N rows containing the optimal algorithms for 1 ≤ n ≤ N and
their costs.
1: Enter the classical algorithm and cost 1 for n = 1 into T
2: for n = 2, . . . , N do
3: bestalgorithm← unknown, mincost← +infinity
4: for A = K2, . . . ,M7 do
5: Compute MA(n) according to (3.2)
6: if MA(n) < mincost then
7: bestalgorithm← A, mincost← MA(n)
8: end if
9: end for
10: if n < 13 then
11: MCn ← 2n
2 − 2n+ 1
12: if MCn(n) < mincost then
13: bestalgorithm← Cn, mincost← MCn(n)
14: end if
15: end if
16: Enter bestalgorithm and mincost for n into T
17: end for
Theorem 4. Algorithm 4 works correctly as specified. The operations (arithmetic, table
look-up) have integers with O(logN) bits as input, and their total number is O(N).
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Proof. We only show correctness, by induction on n. The case n = 1 is clear. So let
n > 1, and A ∈ T∗ be an optimal algorithm for n-bit polynomials as in Lemma 3-
(iii). We write A = BC with B ∈ T and C ∈ T∗. If B is non-classical, then it is
tested for in steps 4-9, and by induction, an optimal algorithm D is chosen for the calls
at size m = dn/bBe. Thus MD(m) ≤ MC(m) and in fact, equality holds. Therefore
MA(n) = MBD(n), and indeed an optimal algorithm BD is entered into T . If B is
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Figure 3.5: The number of bit operations of the classical, recursive Karatsuba, and the
hybrid methods to multiply polynomials of degree smaller than 128
The optimal recursive method for each polynomial length up to 8192 is shown in
Table 3.6. The column “length” of this table represents the length (or the range of lengths)
of polynomials for which the method specified in the column “method” must be used. As
an example, for 194-bit polynomials the method M7 is used at the top level. This requires
22 multiplications of polynomials with d194/7e = 28 bits, which are done by means of
K2 on top of 14-bit polynomials. These 14-bit multiplications are executed again usingK2
and finally polynomials of length 7 are multiplied classically. Thus the optimal algorithm
isA =M7K22C7, of total cost MA(194) = 22 ·MK22C7(28)+3937 = 26575 bit operations.
Figure 3.5 shows the recursive cost of the Karatsuba method, as used by Weimerskirch
& Paar (2003), of our hybrid method, and the classical method.
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length method length method length method
1 − 5 C1 − C5 301 − 320 K2 1603 − 1610 M5
6 K2 321 − 343 M7 1611 − 1728 M6
7 C7 344 − 360 M5 1729 − 1792 M7
8 K2 361 − 384 K2 1793 − 1800 M5
9 K3 385 − 392 M7 1801 − 1920 M6
10 K2 393 − 400 M5 1921 − 1960 M7
11 C11 401 − 420 M7 1961 − 2048 K2
12 − 14 K2 421 − 432 K2 2049 − 2058 M7
15 K3 433 − 448 M7 2059 − 2100 M5
16 − 20 K2 449 − 450 M5 2101 − 2240 M7
21 M7 451 − 454 K2 2241 − 2304 M6
22 − 24 K2 455 M5 2305 − 2352 M7
25 M5 456 K2 2353 − 2400 M6
26 − 27 K3 457 − 460 M5 2401 − 2560 K2
28 − 40 K2 461 − 512 K2 2561 − 2744 M7
41 − 42 M7 513 − 525 M5 2745 − 2800 M5
43 − 45 K3 526 − 560 M7 2801 − 2880 M6
46 − 48 K2 561 − 576 K2 2881 − 3072 K2
49 M7 577 − 588 M7 3073 − 3136 M7
50 M5 589 − 600 M5 3137 − 3200 M5
51 − 64 K2 601 − 640 K2 3201 − 3456 M6
65 − 70 M7 641 − 686 M7 3457 − 3584 M7
71 − 80 K2 687 − 720 M5 3585 − 3840 M6
81 − 84 M7 721 − 768 K2 3841 − 3920 M7
85 − 96 K2 769 − 784 M7 3921 − 4096 K2
97 − 98 M7 785 − 800 M5 4097 − 4116 M7
99 − 100 M5 801 − 840 M7 4117 − 4200 M5
101 − 105 M7 841 − 864 M6 4201 − 4320 M6
106 − 108 K2 865 − 896 M7 4321 − 4480 M7
109 − 112 M7 897 − 900 M5 4481 − 4608 M6
113 − 128 K2 901 − 912 M6 4609 − 4704 M7
129 − 140 M7 913 − 920 M5 4705 − 4800 M6
141 − 144 K2 921 − 936 M6 4801 − 5120 K2
145 − 147 M7 937 − 940 M5 5121 − 5184 M6
148 − 150 M5 941 − 960 M6 5185 − 5488 M7
151 − 160 K2 961 − 980 M7 5489 − 5600 M5
161 − 168 M7 981 − 1024 K2 5601 − 5880 M6
169 − 175 M5 1025 − 1029 M7 5881 − 5888 K2
176 − 192 K2 1030 − 1050 M5 5889 − 5952 M6
193 − 196 M7 1051 − 1120 M7 5953 − 6016 K2
197 − 200 M5 1121 − 1152 M6 6017 − 6144 M6
201 − 210 M7 1153 − 1176 M7 6145 − 6272 M7
211 − 216 K2 1177 − 1200 M5 6273 − 6400 M5
217 − 224 M7 1201 − 1280 K2 6401 − 6912 M6
225 M5 1281 − 1372 M7 6913 − 7168 M7
226 − 256 K2 1373 − 1440 M5 7169 − 7680 M6
257 − 280 M7 1441 − 1536 K2 7681 − 7840 M7
281 − 288 K2 1537 − 1568 M7 7841 − 8064 M6
289 − 294 M7 1569 − 1600 M5 8065 − 8192 K2
295 − 300 M5 1601 − 1602 M6
Table 3.6: Optimal multiplications for polynomial lengths up to 8192
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Lemma 3 implies that the classical methods need only be considered for n ≤ 12. We
can prune T further and now illustrate this forK3. One first checks thatMAK3B(3bAbB) <
MK3AB(3bAbB) for A ∈ {K2,M5,M6,M7}, B ∈ T∗, and bB ≥ 2. Therefore for K3 to
be the top-level tool in an optimal algorithm over T the next algorithm to it must be either
K3 or Cb for some b. Since the classical method is not optimal for n ≥ 13 and Table 3.6
does not list K3 in the interval 46 to 3 ·45 = 135, K3 is not the top-level tool for n ≥ 135.
Table 3.7 gives the asymptotic behavior of the costs of the algorithms in the toolbox T
when used recursively. It is expected that for very large polynomials only the asymptot-
ically fastest method, namely M6, should be used. But due to the tiny differences in the
cost exponents this seems to happen only for very large polynomial lengths, beyond the
sizes which are shown in Table 3.6.
algorithm k
Cb, b ≥ 2 logb b
2 = 2
K3 log3 6 ≈ 1.6309
M5 log5 13 ≈ 1.5937
M7 log7 22 ≈ 1.5885
K2 log2 3 ≈ 1.5850
M6 log6 17 ≈ 1.5812
Table 3.7: Asymptotical cost O(nk) of algorithms in the toolbox T
3.4 Hardware Structure
The delay of a fully parallel combinational Karatsuba multiplier is 4dlog2 ne, which is al-
most 4 times that of a classical multiplier, namely dlog2 ne+1. It is the main disadvantage
of the Karatsuba method for hardware implementations. As a solution, we have suggested
in Grabbe et al. (2003a) a pipelined Karatsuba multiplier for 240-bit polynomials, shown
in Figure 3.8.
The innermost part of the design is a combinational pipelined 40-bit classical multi-
plier equipped with 40-bit and 79-bit adders. The multiplier, these adders, and the overlap















Figure 3.8: The 240-bit multiplier in Grabbe et al. (2003a)
module, together with a control circuit, constitute a 120-bit multiplier. The algorithm
is based on a modification of a Karatsuba formula for 3-segment polynomials which is
similar to but slightly different from what we have used in Section 3.3. Another suit-
able control circuit performs the 2-segment Karatsuba method for 240 bits by means of a
120-bit recursion, 239-bit adders, and an overlap circuit.
This multiplier can be seen as implementing the factorization 240 = 2·3·40. Table 3.6
implies that it is preferable to use 2 or 5-segment for larger polynomials rather than the
3-segment method. On the other hand the complicated structure of the 5-segment method
makes it difficult to use it for pipelining in the upper levels. A new design is presented
here which is based on the factorization 240 = 2 · 2 · 2 · 30. The resulting structure is
shown in Figure 3.9.
The 30-bit multiplier follows the recipe of Table 3.6. It is a combinational circuit
without feedback and the design goal is to minimize its area. In general, k pipeline stages
can perform n parallel multiplications in n + k − 1 instead of nk clock cycles without
pipelining.
The new design, the structure of Grabbe et al. (2003a), and a purely classical method
are designed on an XC2V6000-4FF1517-4 FPGA. The last design has a classical 30-bit
multiplier and applies the three classical recursion steps to it. The results after place and
route are shown in Table 3.10. The second column shows the number of clock cycles for





















Figure 3.9: The new 240-bit multiplier
a multiplication. The third column represents the area in terms of the number of slices.
This measure contains both logic elements, or LUTs, and flip-flops used for pipelining.
The fourth column is the multiplication time as returned by the hardware synthesis tool.
Finally the last column shows the product of area and time in order to compare the AT
measures of our designs.
The synchronization is set so that the 30-bit multipliers require 1 and 4 clock cycles
for classical and hybrid Karatsuba implementations, respectively. The new structure is
smaller than the implementation in Grabbe et al. (2003a) but is larger than the classical
one. This drawback is due to the complicated structure of the Karatsuba method but is
compensated by the speed as seen in the time and AT measures. In the next section this is
further improved by decreasing the number of recursions.
Multiplier type Number of Number of Multiplication AT
clock cycles slices time Slices× µs
classical 106 1328 1.029µs 1367
Grabbe et al. (2003a)
(Fig. 3.8)
54 1660 0.655µs 1087
Hybrid Karatsuba (Fig. 3.9) 55 1513 0.670µs 1014
Table 3.10: Time and area of different multipliers for 240-bit polynomials
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3.5 Hybrid Polynomial Multiplier with Few Recursions
The timing diagram of the recursive multiplier for the time interval 50 ns < t < 280 ns
is shown in Figure 3.11. In this figure the lowest level which is the combinational module
communicates with the highest level through intermediate stages in several clock cycles.
At time t = 180 ns after two 120-bit blocks being multiplied the 60-bit multiplier activates
its READY60 signal to inform the 120-bit multiplier to load it with new data. The 120-bit
multiplier has to transfer this request to the 240-bit multiplier. Each of the multipliers
require one clock cycle to start the lower multiplier. As a result it takes 5 clock cycles for
the whole communication. This example reveals that in the recursive Karatsuba multiplier
of Grabbe et al. (2003a), the core of the system, namely the combinational multiplier, is
idle for several clock cycles during the multiplication. To improve resource usage, we
reduce the communication overhead by decreasing the levels of recursion. In this new
240-bit multiplier, an 8-segment Karatsuba is applied at once to 30-bit polynomials. The
formulas describing three recursive levels of Karatsuba are computed symbolically and
implemented directly.
The new circuit is shown in Figure 3.12. The multiplexers mux1 to mux6 are adders
at the same time. Their inputs are 30-bit sections of the two original 240-bit polynomials
which are added according to the Karatsuba rules. Now their 27 output pairs are pipelined
as inputs into the 30-bit multiplier. The 27 corresponding 59-bit polynomials are subse-
quently combined according to the overlap rules to yield the final result. Time and space
consumptions are shown in Table 3.13 and compared with the results of Grabbe et al.
(2003a). The columns are as in Table 3.10. It can be seen that this design improves on the





















time = 180 ns
Figure 3.11: Timing diagram of the recursive Karatsuba multiplier for 240-bit polynomials in Figure 3.9




















Figure 3.12: The structure of the Karatsuba multiplier with fewer number of recursions.
Multiplier type Number of Number of Multiplication AT
clock cycles slices time Slices× µs
classical 65 1582 0.523µs 827
Grabbe et al. (2003a)
(Fig. 3.8)
54 1660 0.655µs 1087
Fewer recursions (Fig. 3.12) 30 1480 0.378µs 559
Table 3.13: Time and area of different 240-bit multipliers compared with the structure
with reduced number of recursion levels
3.6 Code Generator
As it has been shown in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, using a pipelined modular structure to
implement the Karatsuba multiplication algorithm has several advantages. However, im-
plementing the parallel multipliers for smaller polynomials is the main difficulty of this
structure. Handwriting a VHDL code for these blocks is time consuming, particularly
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when accurate insertion of pipeline stages is desired.
In this section an object oriented library is presented which can be used for automat-
ically generating the VHDL code of a combinational pipelined multiplier of any degree.
This has been achieved by combining the Karatsuba and the classical methods. The gen-
erated code is in register transfer level (RTL).
3.6.1 Code Generator Functionalities
The code generator gives the user the ability of suppling a sequence of pairs of polyno-
mial lengths and type selection parameters. The type selection parameter specifies the
algorithm which is used for each polynomial degree, e.g., the Karatsuba or the classical
algorithm. Then, the program generates the appropriate multiplication method for each
of these degrees and combines them recursively to create the algorithm and consequently
the multiplier.
An important functionality of the code generator is the ability of computing algorithms
for multiplying polynomials, when an algorithm to multiply longer polynomials is found.
The program automatically inserts zero coefficients to the beginnings of the smaller poly-
nomials, makes the multiplication graphs, and removes the unnecessary gates.
The library is also able to report the time and space complexities of the design and
create appropriate pipeline stages by getting the depth of each pipeline stage as the number
of two input gates.
The main part of this code generator consists of the following classes. Each class is
represented with its functionalities:
Multiplication
The class multiplicationmanages the multiplication methods. It creates the appro-
priate classical and Karatsuba methods, their shortenings and combines them recursively.
This class is able to simplify the resulting expressions and to put pipeline registers in the
appropriate positions. Finally, it generates a VHDL code which describes the multiplier.
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An important functionality of the class multiplication is the generation of a
computation graph for the polynomial multiplication. It computes the depth of the graph,
puts pipeline registers according to a specified depth, checks for possible hazards, and
increases the number of these registers when required to remove any hazards (see the sec-
tion on pipelining below). Therefore, a pipelined multiplier can be generated in which the
depth of the stages can be specified by the user as a parameter. A sample program which


















Figure 3.14: A sample code which uses the code generator libraries to produce a Karat-
suba multiplier for polynomials of degree smaller than 6 when the pipeline depth is set to
4.
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Addition Simplifier
The order of performing the additions in an expression has a great impact on the re-
source consumption. When the Karatsuba algorithm is used to multiply polynomials with
large degrees, there are some additions which are redundant and can be performed only
once. class addition simplifier takes a set of additions and generates a specific
sequence to compute it which contains only additions of two operands. This sequence
can be optimized to achieve smaller area or shorter propagation delay. Achieving smaller
area is done in a heuristic manner.
Reducing the Number of Gates
It has already been mentioned that the delay of small block multipliers does not have a
large impact on the whole multiplication time. This happens when the number of indepen-
dent multiplications is higher than the number of pipeline levels (which is often the case).
Hence it is better to reduce the number of two input gates with the cost of increasing the
propagation delay.
In order to identify and simplify redundant additions we count the number of simul-
taneous occurrences of each two variables. The two variables with the most number of
occurrences are gathered together and represented with a new variable, which replaces all
of their simultaneous occurrences. This is repeated until no two variables occur simulta-
neously in more than one expression.
Pipelining
The parallel combinational multipliers have complicated structures in which manually in-
serting the pipeline registers is a complicated task. Pipelining is an optimization technique
which is used in the code generator. However, the pipeline depth must be supplied by the
user as an input to the code generator. In an object of type multiplication, the sequence of
operations is saved as a set of binary trees in which the position of pipeline registers are
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stored.
The most important issue in such a pipeline strategy is the hazard problem. It is
possible that the inputs of a gate arrive in different time slices which will lead to failure
in the computation of the result. To solve this problem, the pipeline generation module
checks all the gates to see if the inputs arrive at the same time. If not, the path to the faster
input will be delayed by an extra register. The Inputs to other modules will be taken from
the former register as shown in Figure 3.15, in which registers are shown with boxes. This













Figure 3.15: Pipelining the multiplier circuit (a) before and (b) after solving the hazard
problem
3.7 Conclusion
Since finite field arithmetics play an important role in cryptography and elliptic curves,
this chapter is devoted to the application of asymptotically fast methods, in particular
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the Karatsuba method in hardware. The materials of this chapter are presented in the
following sequence:
• In Section 3.2 essentials of the Karatsuba method and its costs are analyzed.
• Section 3.3 proposes a new methodology which can be used to combine different
multiplication methods of a toolbox to achieve a new algorithm. The new algorithm
can be found in a time that is linear in the polynomial degree and its number of
bit operations for each polynomial degree is at most equal to the number of bit
operations for the best algorithm of the toolbox for that degree.
• Section 3.4 is devoted to the review of the multiplier of Grabbe et al. (2003a). The
main contribution of this section is the application of the hybrid method to that
multiplier and reducing the area in this way.
• In Section 3.5 fewer recursions are used to decrease the communication time be-
tween different modules in the modular Karatsuba multiplier. In this way multipli-
ers are achieved which are better than the classical and the method of Grabbe et al.
(2003a) with respect to both time and area.
• Finally Section 3.6 introduces a C++ based code generator by describing its func-
tionalities and structure. This library is developed to generate the VHDL description
of combinational pipelined multipliers and is used for the smaller multipliers of this
chapter.
Chapter 4
Small Area Normal Basis Multipliers:
Gauß meets Pascal
4.1 Introduction
Normal basis representation of finite fields enables easy computation of the qth power of
elements. Assuming q to be a prime power, a basis of the form (α, αq, · · · , αqn−1) for Fqn
is called a normal basis generated by the normal element α ∈ Fqn . In this basis the qth
power of an element can be computed by means of a single cyclic shift. This property
makes such bases very attractive for parallel exponentiation in finite fields (see No¨cker
(2001)).
Since multiplication in these bases is more expensive than in polynomial basis it is
especially desirable to reduce their multiplication costs. In this chapter, a new method for
multiplication in normal bases of type 2 is suggested. It uses an area efficient circuit to
convert the normal basis representation to polynomials and vice versa. Any method can
be used to multiply the resulting polynomials. Although this structure has small area, its
propagation delay is longer than other methods and is only suitable for applications where
the area is limited.
One popular normal basis multiplier is the Massey-Omura multiplier presented for the
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2 3 5 11 23 29 41 53 83 89
113 131 173 179 191 233 239 251 281 293
359 419 431 443 491 509 593 641 653 659
683 719 743 761 809 911 953 1013 1019 1031
1049 1103 1223 1229 1289 1409 1439 1451 1481 1499
1511 1559 1583 1601 1733 1811 1889 1901 1931 1973
2003 2039 2063 2069 2129 2141 2273 2339 2351 2393
2399 2459 2543 2549 2693 2699 2741 2753 2819 2903
2939 2963 2969 3023 3299 3329 3359 3389 3413 3449
3491 3539 3593 3623 3761 3779 3803 3821 3851 3863
3911 4019 4073 4211 4271 4349 4373 4391 4409 4481
4733 4793 4871 4919 4943
Table 4.1: The prime numbers n < 5000 for which F2n contains an optimal normal basis
of type 2.
first time by Omura & Massey (1986). The space and time complexities of this multiplier
increase with the number of nonzero coefficients in the matrix representation of the en-
domorphism x→ αx over Fqn , where α generates the normal basis. Mullin et al. (1989)
show that this number is at least 2n− 1 which can be achieved for optimal normal bases.
Gao & Lenstra (1992) specify exactly the finite fields for which optimal normal bases
exist. Relating these bases with the Gauss periods they grouped them into optimal normal
bases of type 1 and 2 according to the Gauss periods used.
For security reasons only prime extension degrees are used in cryptography, whereas
the extension degrees of the finite fields containing an optimal normal basis of type 1
are always composite numbers. Cryptography standards often suggest the finite fields for
which the type of normal bases are small (see for example FIPS PUB 186-2 (2000)) to
enable designers to deploy normal bases. Table 4.1 shows the prime numbers n, when
n < 5000, for which F2n contains an optimal normal basis of type 2. Applications in
cryptography have stimulated research about efficient multiplication using optimal nor-
mal bases of type 2. The best space complexity results for the type 2 multipliers are n2
and 3n(n−1)/2 gates of types AND and XOR, respectively reported in Sunar & Koc¸ (2001)
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and Reyhani-Masoleh & Hasan (2002). Their suggested circuits are obtained by suitably
modifying the Massey-Omura multiplier. A classical polynomial basis multiplier, how-
ever, requires n2 and (n−1)2 gates of types AND and XOR respectively for the polynomial
multiplication, followed by a modular reduction. The latter is done using a small circuit of
size of (r − 1)n, where r is the number of nonzero coefficients in the polynomial which
is used to create the polynomial basis. It is conjectured by von zur Gathen & No¨cker
(2005) that there are usually irreducible trinomials of degree n and for the cases that there
is no irreducible trinomial an irreducible pentanomial can be found. The above costs and
the fact that there are asymptotically fast methods for polynomial arithmetic suggest the
use of polynomial multipliers for normal bases to make good use of both representations.
The proposed multiplier in this chapter works in normal bases but its space complexity
is similar to polynomial multipliers. Using classical polynomial multiplication methods,
it requires 2n2 + 16n log2(n) gates in F2n . Moreover, using more efficient polynomial
multiplication algorithms, such as the Karatsuba algorithm, we can decrease the space
asymptotically even further down to O(nlog2 3).
The connection between polynomial and normal bases, together with its application
in achieving high performance multiplication in normal bases, has been investigated in
Gao et al. (1995) and Gao et al. (2000). The present work can be viewed as a concep-
tual continuation of the approach in those papers. Gao et al. (2000) describe how the
multiplication using the normal bases generated by the Gauss periods can be reduced to
multiplications of polynomials. For the case of the Gauss periods of type (n, 2), their
proposed method requires multiplication of two 2n-bit polynomials which will be done
using asymptotically fast methods, as suggested in their works.
The multiplier of this chapter is based on a similar approach. For optimal normal
bases of type 2 we present a very efficient method which changes the representations
between the normal basis and suitable polynomials. These polynomials are multiplied
using any method of choice, such as the classical or the Karatsuba multiplier. Using
the inverse transformation circuit and an additional small circuit the result is converted
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back into the normal basis representation. The heart of this method is a factorization of
the transformation matrix between the two representations into a small product of sparse
matrices. The circuit requires roughly O(n logn) gates and resembles the circuit used for
computing the Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT). The analogy to the FFT circuit goes
even further: as with the FFT, the inverse of the transformation has a very similar circuit.
It should be noted that a general basis conversion, and not for a specific set of bases,
requires O(n2) operation as also reported by Kaliski & Liskov (1999).
This chapter will begin with a review of the Gauss periods and the normal bases of
type 2. Then the structure of the multiplier is introduced and the costs of each part of the
multiplier are computed. The last section focuses the results on fields of characteristic 2
and compares the results with the literature.
4.2 Gauss Periods
Let n, k ≥ 1 be integers such that r = nk+1 is a prime, and let q be a prime power which
is relatively prime to r. Then the group Z×r of units modulo r is cyclic, has nk elements,
and since qnk ≡ 1 mod r, r divides qnk − 1 = #F×
qnk
. Hence there exists a primitive rth
root of unity β ∈ Fqnk . Let G < Z×r be the unique subgroup of the cyclic group Z×r with





Then α is called a prime Gauss period of type (n, k) over Fq. Wassermann (1993) and
Gao et al. (2000) prove the following theorem:
Theorem 5. Let r = nk+1 be a prime not dividing q, e the index of q in Z×r , G the unique






is a normal element in Fqn over Fq if and only if gcd(e, n) = 1.
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In this chapter we consider the Gauss periods of type (n, 2). In this case G = {1,−1}
and α is of the form β+β−1, where β is a 2n+1st root of unity in F2nq . Hence the normal
basis is





and as is shown in Wassermann (1993) and Gao et al. (2000):
{1,−1, q,−q, · · · , qn−1,−qn−1} = {1,−1, 2,−2, · · · , n,−n}
if the computations are modulo 2n + 1. Since β2n+1 = 1 each βqr + β−qr , 0 ≤ r < n,
















l + β−l), (4.2)
where (a(N
′)
l )1≤l≤n is a permutation of (a
(N)
k )0≤k<n. We call the sequence
N′ = (β + β−1, β2 + β−2, · · · , βn + β−n),
in this case, the permuted normal basis and the vector (a(N
′)
l )1≤l≤n the permuted normal
representation of a.
4.3 Multiplier Structure
The structure of the multiplier is described in Figure 4.2. To multiply two elements a, b ∈


















i ∈ Fq. By inserting a zero at the beginning of the representation vectors
and a linear mapping pin+1, which we define in Section 4.4, from Fn+1q to Fq[x]≤n the
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vectors of these representations are converted to polynomials ϕa(x) and ϕb(x) such that
the evaluations of these two polynomials at β + β−1 are a and b, respectively. The poly-
nomials ϕa and ϕb are then multiplied using an appropriate method with respect to the
polynomial degrees and implementation platform. Obviously the evaluation of the result-
ing polynomial ϕc(x) at β + β−1 is the product c = a · b. The polynomial ϕc(x) is of
degree at most 2n and the evaluation is a linear combination of (β+β−1)i for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n.
Using another linear mapping ν2n+1 from Fq[x]≤2n to F2n+1q , namely the inverse of pi2n+1,
this linear combination is converted to a linear combination of the vectors 1 and βi + β−i
for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n. This is then converted to the permuted normal basis using another linear
mapping τn.
The linear mapping ν2n+1 takes a polynomial in Fq[x]≤2n, evaluates it at β + β−1, and
represents the result as a linear combination of 1 and βi + β−i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n. Since
the above vectors are linearly dependent there are several choices for ν2n+1. One way
to compute the resulting linear combination is that each (β + β−1)j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n
be expanded as a linear combination of βi + β−i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n. The coefficients of
these expansions have tight connections with the binomial coefficients or the entries of
the Pascal triangle. Since β ∈ Fq2n , if we denote the characteristic of Fq by p, we have
p·β = 0 and the matrix representation of ν2n+1 has a similar structure as the Pascal triangle
in which the entries are reduced modulo p. Such a triangle which has a fractal structure has
attracted a lot of attention and has been given various names in the literature. One of the
most famous ones is “Sierpinski triangle” or “Sierpinski gasket” (see Wikipedia (2006))
for p = 2. In Section 4.5 we find a special factorization for the matrix representation
of ν2n+1 in an appropriate basis which allows the mapping to be computed in O(n logn)
operations.
4.3.1 Example over F25
Here the overall operation of the multiplier for F25 is exemplified. Since 11 divides 210−1
there is an 11th root of unity in F210 which is represented by β. Setting r, k, and q of
















ϕa(x) ϕb(β + β
−1) = bϕa(β + β
−1) = a ϕb(x)
ϕc(x) = ϕa · ϕb
Polynomial multiplication











zero insertion zero insertion




Figure 4.2: Overview of our multiplier structure to multiply two elements a, b ∈ Fqn ,
where their two representation vectors (a(N)i )1≤i≤n and (b
(N)
i )1≤i≤n with respect to the
normal basis N are given. See the text for more information.
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Theorem 5 to 11, 2, and 2, respectively, implies that α = β + β−1 constructs the normal
basis N for F25 over F2:







Since β is an 11th root of unity the following equalities hold:













= β5 + β−5.
(4.3)
and
N′ = (β + β−1, β2 + β−2, β3 + β−3, β4 + β−4, β5 + β−5)
is the permuted normal basis. We represent the vectors of the permuted normal repre-
sentations of a and b by aN′ = (a(N
′)
i )1≤i≤5 and bN′ = (b
(N′)
i )1≤i≤5, respectively. These
vectors satisfy the equations:
a = N′ · aTN′ , and b = N′ · bTN′ . (4.4)
Our strategy is to find polynomials ϕa(x) and ϕb(x) over Fq whose evaluations at β+β−1
give the elements a and b, respectively. Then these polynomials are multiplied and the
evaluation of the result at β + β−1 is converted back to the normal basis representation.
Each power (β + β−1)j can be represented as a linear combination of βi + β−i, for
0 ≤ i ≤ j, in which the coefficients are in F2. Hence we have the following equality:
P = N˜′ · L6, (4.5)
in which:
N˜′ = (1, β + β−1, β2 + β−2, β3 + β−3, β4 + β−4, β5 + β−5),
P = (1, β + β−1, (β + β−1)2, (β + β−1)3, (β + β−1)4, (β + β−1)5),
and the matrix L6, whose entries are calculated using the binomial coefficients modulo 2,
is shown in part (a) of Figure 4.3. This matrix is upper triangular and hence invertible.
We represent its inverse, which is shown in part (b) of Figure 4.3, by P6, then:
N˜′ = P · P6. (4.6)
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.3: (a) The matrix L6 and (b) its inverse P6
The entries of the vectors N˜′ and P are elements of F25 , which has dimension 5 over
F2. These entries in each of the vectors are linearly dependent but still span F25 and
each element of F25 can be written as a linear combination – which is not unique –
of these elements. To represent a and b with respect to these new vectors we insert




i )0≤i≤5 and bN˜′ = (b˜
(N˜′)

















Similar to (4.4) we have:
a = N˜′ · aT
N˜′
, and b = N˜′ · bT
N˜′
. (4.7)
Substituting N˜′ from (4.6) we have:
a = P · P6 · a
T
N˜′
, and b = P · P6 · bTN˜′ . (4.8)
Now consider the two vectors aP = P6 ·aTN˜′ = (a
(P)
i )0≤i≤5 and bP = P6·bTN˜′ = (b
(P)
i )0≤i≤5.











whose evaluations at β + β−1, according to (4.8), give a and b, respectively. Let the














i (β + β
−1)i.
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Figure 4.4: The matrix L11
In the same way as above we can use the matrix L11 which corresponds
((β + β−1)i)0≤i≤10 with the vector containing 1 and βi + β−i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10. The



















As it will be seen later c˜(N˜
′)
0 for fields of characteristic 2 is always zero. For other fields
we need to compute the representation of 1 and multiply it by c˜(N˜
′)
0 . On the other hand
since β11 = 1 we have
β6 + β−6 = β5 + β−5, β7 + β−7 = β4 + β−4,
β8 + β−8 = β3 + β−3, β9 + β−9 = β2 + β−2, and
β10 + β−10 = β + β−1.











































respectively. In the next sections we compute the costs of each of the above tasks for
general p and n.
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4.4 Polynomials from Normal Bases
The most important parts of the multiplier are the converters between polynomial and
permuted normal representations. Since the elements (β + β−1)i, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, and also
1 and βi + β−i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, are linearly dependent there are different possibilities
for the selection of the mappings pin+1 and ν2n+1 from Section 4.3. These mappings are
defined via matrices Pn+1 ∈ F(n+1)×(n+1)p and L2n+1 ∈ F(2n+1)×(2n+1)p , where p is the
characteristic of Fqn . These matrices have special factorizations which let them to be
multiplied by vectors of appropriate length using O(n logn) operations in Fq.
The idea behind the construction of these matrices is similar to the example in Sec-
tion 4.3. The permuted representations of a and b are preceeded by zero and Pn+1 is
multiplied by the resulting vectors. The structure of the inverse of Pn+1 which we denote
by Ln+1 is easier to describe. Hence we define a candidate for Ln+1 and show that this
matrix can be used to convert from polynomial to the extended permuted normal repre-
sentation, i.e., it satisfies
(1, β + β−1, β2 + β−2, · · · , βn + β−n)Ln+1 =
(1, β + β−1, (β + β−1)2, · · · , (β + β−1)n).
We also show that Ln+1 is invertible. Then we study its structure and show how it can
be factored into sparse factors in Section 4.5. This factorization is also used to find a
factorization for Pn.
Definition 6. Let p be the characteristic of Fq, for integers i, j let li,j ∈ Fp be such that
(x + x−1)j =
∑
i∈Z li,jx
i in Fp[x], for a variable x, and Lq,n = (li,j)0≤i,j<n ∈ Fn×np .
Obviously li,j = 0 for |i| > |j|. (Lq,n depends on p but not on logp q.)
Example 7. Let q = 9, i.e., p = 3. For 0 ≤ j < 9, the powers (x+ x−1)j are:




2 x2 + 2 + x−2
3 x3 + x−3
4 x4 + x2 + x−2 + x−4
5 x5 + 2x3 + x+ x−1 + 2x−3 + x−5
6 x6 + 2 + x−6
7 x7 + x5 + 2x+ 2x−1 + x−5 + x−7
8 x8 + 2x6 + x4 + 2x2 + 1 + 2x−2 + x−4 + 2x−6 + x−8.
Hence the matrix L9,9 is: 

1 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0




Theorem 8. The matrix Lq,n of Definition 6 satisfies
(1, β + β−1, β2 + β−2, · · · , βn−1 + β−n+1)Lq,n =
(1, β + β−1, (β + β−1)2, · · · , (β + β−1)n−1),
(4.9)









Proof. Since (x+ x−1)j = (x−1 + x)j we have li,j = l−i,j and for any 0 ≤ j < n:
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since li,j = 0 for i > j. This shows that the jth entries on the left and right sides of (4.9)
















in which the binomial coefficients are reduced modulo p and the coefficient of xi is the
entry (Lq,n)i,j. All of the powers of x in (4.10) when i > j have zero coefficients. For
the remaining terms if i − j is odd there is no integer k such that i = j − 2k, hence the






. Since Lq,n is upper triangular its determinant is the product of all elements





= 1 and the determinant is also equal to
1.
Definition 9. Let Lq,n be as defined in Definition 6. We denote its inverse by Pq,n =
(pi,j)0≤i,j<n, where pi,j ∈ Fp and p is the characteristic of Fq.
As we have seen the entries of the matrix Lq,n and consequently Pq,n depend on p, the
characteristic of Fq, and n. Since the finite field is usually fixed during our analysis we
drop the symbol q and show the matrices as Ln and Pn for the sake of simplicity. In the
next sections we see how special factorizations of Pn and Ln result in fast methods for the
multiplication of these matrices by vectors.
4.5 Factorizations of the Conversion Matrices
The costs of computing the isomorphisms pin and νn of Section 4.3 depend on the structure
of the corresponding matrices. As in the last section, it is easier to initially study the
structure ofLn and use this information to analyze Pn. The former study will be simplified
by assuming n to be a power of p, say pr, and extending the results to general n later. This
simplification enables a recursive study of Lpr which is shown in Example 10 and will be
discussed in Lemma 15. This recursive structure is then later used in Theorem 17 to find
a factorization of Lpr into sparse matrices.
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1 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Figure 4.5: The block representation of the matrix L9
Example 10. The matrix L9 has been computed in Example 7. The entries of this matrix
are rewritten in Figure 4.5. In this figure L9 is divided into nine blocks which have three
rows and three columns each. These blocks can be grouped in three different groups. The
ones which are colored in light gray contain only zero entries. We show these blocks as
Z3×3. The second group are the ones in blue and have structures which are very similar to
the block in the first row and first column which is obviously L3. Each block of this group
in the ith row and jth column is the product of ( j
(j−i)/2
)
by L3. The elements of the third
group are colored in green. They are equal in our special example but if we represent the
block in the first row and second column with L′3, the block in the ith row and jth column
can be written as the product of ( j
(j−i−1)/2
)
and L′3. Indeed the matrix L′3 can also be
written as the product of the matrix Θ3 which is
Θ3 =











































The above recursive relation is generally true between Lpr and Lpr−1 as will be proved
in Lemma 15. To formally describe the above relation we define three matrices of reflec-
tion, shifting, and factorization denoted by Θn, Ψn, and Br, respectively.
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Figure 4.6: The matrix Θ5
Figure 4.7: The matrix Ψ5




1 if i+ j = n,
0 otherwise.
An example, Θ5, is shown in Figure 4.6 where the coefficients equal to 0 and 1 are
represented by empty and filled boxes, respectively. Left multiplication by Θn reflects a
matrix horizontally and shifts the result by one row downwards.




1 if j − i = 1,
0 otherwise.
Right multiplication by Ψn shifts a matrix by one position upwards. As an example
Ψ5 is shown in Figure 4.7.
Definition 13. Let Ipr−1 be the identity pr−1 × pr−1 matrix and Θpr−1 and Ψp as in Def-
initions 11 and 12, respectively. Then we define the factorization matrix Br ∈ Fpr×prp to
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be:
Br = Lp ⊗ Ipr−1 + (ΨpLp)⊗Θpr−1,
in which ⊗ is the Kronecker or tensor product operator.
The following theorem gives us more information about the structure of Br which can
be helpful for constructing this matrix.

















Proof. For 0 ≤ i0, j0 < pr−1 we consider (B(i1,j1))i0,j0 . Definition 13 implies that:
(B(i1,j1))i0,j0 = (Br)i1pr−1+i0,j1pr−1+j0 = (Lp)i1,j1(Ipr−1)i0,j0 + (ΨpLp)i1,j1(Θpr−1)i0,j0.
Using Definition 12 the only nonzero entry of the i1th row of Ψp is a 1 in the i1 + 1st
column, if i1 + 1 < p, and hence (ΨpLp)i1,j1 = li1+1,j1 and the above equation can be
written as:
(B(i1,j1))i0,j0 = li1,j1(Ipr−1)i0,j0 + li1+1,j1(Θpr−1)i0,j0. (4.11)
Now using Theorem 8:
• If i1 > j1, then li1,j1 and li1+1,j1 and hence also (B(i1,j1))i0,j0 are zero.





and li1+1,j1 is zero.






j1 − i1 − 1 is even.
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r = 1
r = 2
r = 3 r = 4
Figure 4.8: The matrices Br for p = 3 and 4 values of r
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The matrices Br for 4 values of r = 1, 2, 3, 4 are shown in Figure 4.8 with colors
light blue, green, and dark blue for values of 0, 1, and 2 respectively. We now prove the
following lemma.
Lemma 15. The following equation holds for r ≥ 1:
Lpr = Br(Ip ⊗ Lpr−1). (4.12)
Proof. For 0 ≤ i, j < pr we compute (Lpr)i,j by writing:
i = i1p
r−1 + i0, j = j1p
r−1 + j0, (4.13)
with 0 ≤ i1, j1 < p and 0 ≤ i0, j0 < pr−1. Since p · x = 0:
(x+ x−1)j = (x+ x−1)j1p
r−1


















where lk,j is as Definition 6 and is zero for |k| > |j|. For the coefficient of xi = xi1p
r−1+i0
,
which is (Lpr)i,j, we have:
k1p
r−1 + k0 = i1p
r−1 + i0 =⇒ k0 ≡ i0 mod p
r−1 =⇒{
k0 = i0 + tp
r−1
k1 = i1 − t
,with t ∈ Z. (4.15)
In the above equation except for t = −1, 0 we have |i0 + tpr−1| ≥ |pr−1| > |j0| which
means li0+tpr−1,j0 = 0 and hence:
(Lpr)i,j = li1,j1li0,j0 + li1+1,j1li0−pr−1,j0 (4.16)
in which li1,j1 = (Lp)i1,j1 , li0,j0 = (Lpr−1)i0,j0 , and we have seen in the proof of Theo-
rem 14 that li1+j1 = (ΨpLp)i1,j1 . The value of li0−pr−1,j0 can be replaced by lpr−1−i0,j0
because of the symmetry of the binomial coefficients. The latter can again be replaced by
(Θpr−1Lpr−1)i0,j0 since for 0 < i0 < pr−1 the only nonzero entry in the i0th row of Θpr−1
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is in the pr−1 − i0th column and hence (Θpr−1Lpr−1)i0,j0 is the entry in the pr−1 − i0th
row and j0th column of Lpr−1 . For i0 = 0 the entry (Θpr−1Lpr−1)i0,j0 is zero since there
is no nonzero entry in the i0th row of Θpr−1, and lpr−1,j0 is also zero since j0 < pr−1.
Substituting all of these into (4.16) we will have the following equation:
(Lpr)i,j = (Lp)i1,j1(Lpr−1)i0,j0 + (ΨpLp)i1,j1(Θpr−1Lpr−1)i0,j0 (4.17)
which together with (4.13) shows that:
Lpr = Lp ⊗ Lpr−1 + (ΨpLp)⊗ (Θpr−1Lpr−1). (4.18)
It is straightforward, using Definition 13 to show that (4.18) is equivalent to (4.12).
Example 16. The matrix L81 is shown in Figure 4.9 where the numbers 0, 1, and 2 are
shown with colors light blue, green, and dark blue respectively. The relation between L3r
and L3r−1 is also shown in Figure 4.10.
This recursive relation resembles that for the DFT matrix in Chapter 1 of Loan (1992)
and enables us to find a matrix factorization for Lpr in Theorem 17. Using this factor-
ization the map of a vector under the isomorphism νn can be computed using O(n logn)
operations as will be shown later in Section 4.6.
Theorem 17. The matrix Lpr can be written as:
Lpr = (I1 ⊗Br)(Ip ⊗ Br−1) · · · (Ipr−2 ⊗ B2)(Ipr−1 ⊗ B1). (4.19)
Proof. We use induction on r. If r = 1, then Θ1 is zero and Definition 13 implies that:
Lp = B1 = I1 ⊗B1.
Now assume that (4.19) is correct. Then using Lemma 15 :
Lpr+1 = Br+1(Ip ⊗ Lpr) =
Br+1 · (Ip ⊗ ((I1 ⊗Br)(Ip ⊗ Br−1) · · · (Ipr−2 ⊗ B2)(Ipr−1 ⊗ B1))) =
(I1 ⊗ Br+1) · (Ip ⊗Br) · · · (Ipr−1 ⊗B2)(Ipr ⊗ B1). (4.20)
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Figure 4.9: The matrix L81



































Figure 4.10: The relation between the matrix L3r and its sub-blocks. The sub-block at the





multiplied by the mirror
of L3r−1 .
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Instead of multiplying Lpr by a vector, we successively multiply the matrices in the
factorization of (4.19) by that vector. In the next section we count the number of op-
erations required for the computations of the mappings pin and νn, but before that we
informally describe the relation between Lemma 15 and the Pascal triangle. This infor-
mal description helps in better understanding of that lemma and can probably give some
insights into data structures which are based on the modular Pascal triangle.
Consider a new triangle which is generated from the Pascal triangle in the following
way (See Figures 4.11 and 4.12): At first a zero is inserted between any two horizontally
adjacent entries of the Pascal triangle and every entry is reduced modulo p. This will result
in the expansion of the Pascal triangle and the new triangle is then rotated 90 degrees
counter-clockwise. This triangle can be split into two partitions as shown in Figure 4.11.
In this figure the lower partition consists of the nonzero entries of Lpr , whereas the upper
partition contains the coefficients of the negative powers of x in the expansions of (x +
x−1)j. These negative powers construct, in a similar way to the definition of Lpr , a new
matrix which is shown by L′ in Figure 4.11. The symmetry in the Pascal triangle can now
be interpreted as the relation:
L′pr = Θ · Lpr ,
and is demonstrated in the following example.
Example 18. The powers (x + x−1)j ∈ F9[x], for 0 ≤ j < 9, were shown in Example 7
and can be used to construct L′9. This matrix together with L9 are shown in Figure 4.12-a.
The entries li,j, for i < j, and odd j − i, and l′i,j, for j > pr − i and even j − i, are zero,
independent of the binomial coefficients, and are shown in gray while other entries are
in black. The rotated Pascal triangle modulo 3 is shown in Figure 4.12-b for the ease of
comparison.
To analyze the recursive dependency between Lpr and Lpr−1 we write 0 ≤ i, j < pr
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L′pr
Lpr
Figure 4.11: The relation between the matrices Lpr , L′pr , and the Pascal triangle. The
gray area is the Pascal triangle rotated 90 degrees counter-clockwise in which each entry
is reduced modulo p, and a zero is inserted between any two horizontally adjacent entries.
L′9
L9
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0
1 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
(a)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0
1 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
(b)
Figure 4.12: (a) The entries of the matrices L9 and L′9 and (b) the rotated Pascal triangle
modulo 3
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as i = i1p
r−1 + i0, j = j1p
r−1 + j0 and expand:









(x+ x−1)j0︸ ︷︷ ︸
blocks
. (4.21)
Since 0 ≤ j0 < pr−1 the coefficients of the powers of x in “blocks” make the concatena-
tions of the columns of Lpr−1 and L′pr−1 as shown in Figure 4.11 and Example 18. The
terms in each block created by “blocks” are multiplied by one of the terms in “displace-
ments” which are generally of the form cj′1x
j′1p
r−1
. This can be thought of as multiplying
the block by the scalar cj′1 and moving it by j
′
1p
r−1 positions downwards, in the ma-
trix Lpr . Different values of j1 correspond to horizontal positions of blocks. Since j1
is multiplied by pr−1 and the difference of two powers of x with nonzero coefficients in
“displacements” is at least 2pr−1 and regarding the size of each block, (2pr−1 − 1)× pr−1,
the blocks are non-overlapping. This is shown in Figure 4.13-a. In this figure the blocks
of non-negative and negative powers of x are shown with blue and green triangles, respec-
tively. Note that although the triangles of each group have the same color, their entries
are not equal. All of them are scalar multipliers of the same block.
Since the coefficients of negative powers of x are not directly present in Lpr their
corresponding blocks will be created by multiplyingΘpr−1 by Lpr−1 . Now the two parts of
Br, i.e., Lp⊗Ipr−1 and (ΨpLp)⊗Θpr−1, can be considered as two masks which multiply the
non-negative and negative blocks, Lpr−1 and L′pr−1 , by appropriate binomial coefficients
and put them in the correct positions as shown in Figures 4.13-b and 4.13-c.
4.6 Costs of Computing νn and pin
Multiplication by Lpr consists of several multiplications by Bk for different values of k.
Hence it is better to start the study by counting the required operations for multiplyingBk
by a vector in Fpkq .










Figure 4.13: (a) The recursive structure of the modified Pascal triangle together with the
masking effect of Br for (b) non-negative and (c) negative powers of x in the recursive
construction of Lpr in Lemma 15.
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Definition 19. Let Bk, for the finite field Fq, be as in Definition 13 and p be the charac-
teristic of Fq. We define µadd(k) and µmult(k) to be the number of additions and multipli-
cations in Fq to multiply Bk by a vector in Fp
k
q , respectively.
It should be noted that to compute the functions µadd(k) and µmult(k) we use the
structure of the matrix Bk which is already known and hence the cost of adding an entry
which is known to be zero to an element or that of multiplying one by an element is zero.
As an example since B1, for p = 2, is the identity matrix both µadd(1) and µmult(1) are
zero.
Lemma 20. Let δi,j be the Kronecker delta, i.e., for i, j ∈ N, δi,j is 1 if i = j and
otherwise 0. Then for k ≥ 1 the function µadd(k) is given by:
µadd(k) = (p− 1)(2p
k − p− 1)/4− δp,2/4.
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Figure 4.14: The partitioning of Bk, according to Theorem 14, for two different cases of
(a) odd prime p and (b) p = 2.
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Proof. The block partitioning of Bk, according to Theorem 14, for two different cases of
odd prime p and p = 2 are shown in Figure 4.14. As it can be seen the blocks on the main





Ipk−1 , for 0 ≤ j < p, which equals Ipk−1 . Hence all of the
entries on the main diagonal of Bk are 1. If we denote the number of nonzero entries in
the ith row ofBk byHi(Bk) thenHi(Bk) > 0 and the number of additions to multiply the
ith row ofBk by a vector is at mostHi(Bk)−1. This implies that the number of additions





If we show the number of nonzero entries in Bk, or
∑pk−1
i=0 Hi(Bk), by H(Bk), then the
number of additions to multiply Bk by a vector can be written as:
µadd(k) = H(Bk)− p
k. (4.22)
To compute H(Bk) we use the fact that the nonzero blocks of Bk are scalar multiples of
Ipk−1 with pk−1 nonzero entries and Θpk−1 with pk−1−1 nonzero entries and we count the
number of each of these blocks in Bk.
If p is odd there are 1+ 1+ · · ·+ (p− 1)/2+ (p− 1)/2+ (p+1)/2 = 2
∑(p−1)/2
i=1 i+
(p+1)/2 blocks which are multiples of Ipk−1 and 1 + 1+ · · ·+ (p− 1)/2+ (p− 1)/2 =
2
∑(p−1)/2
i=1 i blocks which are multiples of Θpk−1 . Since
∑(p−1)/2






(pk−1 + pk−1 − 1) +
p + 1
2
pk−1 − pk =
p− 1
4






(2pk + 2pk−1 − p− 1− 2pk−1) = (p− 1)(2pk − p− 1)/4.
(4.23)
For p = 2 the results of (4.23) is 2k−1 − 3/4. In this case there are two blocks which are
I2k−1 and one Θ2k−1 in Bk. Hence H(Bk)− 2k = 2k−1 − 1 = 2k−1 − 3/4− 1/4.
We observe that H(Bk)− pk is also an upper bound for the number of multiplications
in Fq since from the nonzero entries in Bk there are pk entries which are on the main
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diagonal and are 1. These elements do not contribute to any multiplications. There are
possibly other elements in Bk which are 1 but specifying them is complicated. If p = 2
there are only 1s and 0s in Bk and hence multiplication of Bk by a vector is done without
any Fq-multiplications.
Using Lemma 20 we are now in the position to compute the cost of multiplication by
Lpr as shown in the following theorem.
Lemma 21. Multiplying Lpr by a vector in Fp
r
q for r ≥ 1 requires η(r) number of addi-
tions, where
η(r) = r(p− 1)pr/2− (p+ 1)(pr − 1)/4− δp,2(p
r − 1)/(4(p− 1)).
The number of multiplications is not larger than the number of additions.







respectively and since µmult(r) ≤ µadd(r) the total number of multiplications is not larger
than the number of additions. Replacing µadd(k) with its value from Lemma 20 we have:
r∑
k=1


















r−k = (pr − 1)/(p− 1) in (4.24) gives the function η(r) given above.
The following theorem is the result of Lemma 21.
Theorem 22. Multiplication of Ln from Definition 6 by a vector in Fnq can be done using
O(n logn) operations in Fq.
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Proof. Let p be the characteristic of Fq and r = dlogp ne. Obviously the above number of
operations is upper bounded by the number of operations to multiply Lpr by a vector in
F
pr
q . This is given by the function η(r) from Lemma 21. But we have r − 1 < logp n ≤ r
and hence:
η(r) < rpr+1/2 < p2n(logp n + 1)/2.
One interesting fact about this factorization, which distinguishes it from other recur-
sive methods like FFT, is that it is not necessary to use all of the entries of Lpr for values
of n which are between pr−1 and pr. To find a factorization of Ln in this case we use the
factorization of Lpr . Using (4.20) we can write:
Lpr = A0A1 · · ·Ar−1,
where Aj, 0 ≤ j < r, are upper triangular and Aj = Ipj ⊗ Br−j. Obviously Ln consists





1 · · ·A
′
r−1, (4.25)
where each A′j is made up of the first n rows and columns of Aj because each of the
involved matrices are upper triangular. This can be better explained by the following block














As it can be seen the first block of the product matrix depends only on the first blocks of
the multiplicands.
In the next paragraphs we show that the cost of multiplying Ppr by a vector can be
computed by the same formulas as for the cost of multiplying Lpr by a vector. First we
observe that each Br is nonsingular since it is upper-triangular and all of the entries on
the main diagonal are 1. Now we can factorize Ppr , since it is the inverse of Lpr , using
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the factorization of Lpr in (4.20):
Ppr = (Ipr−1 ⊗B
−1
1 )(Ipr−2 ⊗ B
−1





Finding an exact expression for B−1r is not easy but the computation of an upper bound
for the number of nonzero entries in this matrix is achieved by symbolically invertingBr.
As we will see later, the resulting matrix has a block representation in which each block is
a polynomial in Θpr−1 with even or odd powers only. In the next paragraphs we count the
number of nonzero entries in these blocks. The following lemma expresses the number of
nonzero elements in the matrices constructed by such polynomials.
Definition 23. We define even and odd polynomials to be polynomials of the forms f(x2)
and x · f(x2), for a general polynomial f , respectively. The product of two even or odd
polynomials is an even polynomial whereas that of an even and an odd polynomial is an
odd polynomial.
Lemma 24. Let H = (hi,j)0≤i,j<n ∈ Fn×np be such that H = g(Θn) for a polynomial
g. If hi,j is nonzero, then i = j for even g and i + j = n for an odd polynomial g. The
number of nonzero entries in H is at most n and n − 1 for even and odd polynomial g,
respectively.
Proof. Let Φn ∈ Fn×np be the identity matrix with the top-left entry set to zero, i.e.,
(Φn)i,j =
{
1 if i = j and i 6= 0,
0 otherwise.
We have Θ2n = Φn and ΦnΘn = Θn. It follows by induction that Θsn, for s > 0, equals
Φn and Θn for even and odd s, respectively. Hence sums of even and odd powers of Θn
can have at most n and n − 1 nonzero entries, respectively. Note that Θ0n = In is an
even power of Θ which contains n nonzero entries. These nonzero entries must be on the
positions where the entries of In and Θn are nonzero, respectively.
Before we start the last theorem about the number of nonzero entries we need more
information about the structure of Bk which is gathered in the following lemma.
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Lemma 25. Let T = Ipk − Bk = (Ti,j)0≤i,j<p with Ti,j ∈ Fp
k−1×pk−1
























the zero block if j − i < s,
gi,j(Θpk−1) otherwise,
(4.27)
where gi,j ∈ Fp[x] is odd and even for j − i odd and even, respectively, and
3. T p = 0.
Proof. Part 1 can be directly verified by T = Ipk − Bk and Theorem 14. Since T is
strictly upper triangular the blocks on the main diagonal of T s and s− 1 diagonals on top
of that are zero, i.e., T (s)i,j is the zero block whenever j − i < s. To show the condition on
the polynomials gi,j we use again induction on s. For the beginning, Ipk and T obviously
satisfy (4.27) according to Part 1. Now assume that this equation is satisfied for all integers
s < s0 and let s1, s2 < s0 and s0 = s1+ s2. Then the block on the ith row and jth column











Now if j − i is even, j − t and t− i must be both even or odd. In these cases two even or
odd polynomials of Θpk−1 are multiplied and the resulting polynomial will be even. If, on
the other hand, j − i is odd either t − i or j − t is odd and the other one is even. In this
case two polynomials of Θpk−1 are multiplied, so that one of them is odd and the other one
even. This results in an odd polynomial in Θpk−1 . Part 3 is also a direct result of Part 2
since all of the blocks satisfy j − i < p.
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Lemma 26. Multiplication of B−1k by a vector in Fpkq requires at most µadd(k) and
µmult(k) additions and multiplications in Fq, respectively where µadd(k) and µmult(k)
are given in Lemma 20.
Proof. Since T p = 0 we can write:
Ipk − T
p = Ipk = (Ipk − T )(Ipk + T + · · ·+ T
p−1).
Hence using the definition of T in Lemma 25:
Ipk = Bk · (Ipk + T + · · ·+ T
p−1) =⇒ B−1k = Ipk + T + · · ·+ T
p−1. (4.29)
Lemma 25 shows that each T s, for s ≥ 0, and hence B−1k can be partitioned in a way
similar to Lemma 25, such that the block on the ith row and jth column is the zero
block for i > j and an even or an odd polynomial in Θpk−1 for even and odd j − i,
respectively. Note that the zero blocks in the identity matrix are even and odd polynomials
in Θpk−1 . These even and odd polynomials have at most n and n−1 nonzero coefficients,
respectively according to Lemma 24. Now the same method as that of Lemma 20 shows
that the number of Fq-additions and multiplications are bounded by µadd(k) and µmult(k),
respectively.
Theorem 27. Multiplication of Pn from Definition 9 by a vector in Fnq can be done using
O(n logn) operations in Fq.
Proof. Lemma 26 and the same argumentation as Lemma 21 show that multiplication of
Ppr by a vector is done using η(r) operations, where η(r) is given in Lemma 21. Now the
proof is similar to Theorem 22.
We conclude this section with the following theorem. Although its result is not con-
cerned with normal basis multiplication directly, it emphasizes the most important prop-
erty of our multiplier. Namely a specific change of basis in Fqn which can be done using
O(n logn) instead of O(n2) operations, which is the cost of general basis conversion in
Fqn .
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Theorem 28. Let N be a type-II normal basis of Fqn over Fq generated by the normal
element β + β−1 and
P = (1, β + β−1, · · · , (β + β−1)n−1)
be the polynomial basis generated by the minimal polynomial of β+β−1. Then the change
of representation between the two bases N and P can be done usingO(n logn) operations
in Fq.
Proof. The N-basis vector representation of an element is converted to the extended per-
muted representation, as in Figure 4.2, without any arithmetic operations. Then the matrix
Pn+1 is multiplied by this vector using at most η(r) operations, where r = dlogp ne and
p is the characteristic of Fq, and the coefficient of (β + β−1)n is converted to the polyno-
mial basis using at most 2n additions and multiplications in Fq. This cost is O(n logn)
according to Theorem 22.
To convert the representation of an element from P into N we insert a zero, as the coef-
ficient of (β+β−1)n, to the end of the representation vector in P. Then Ln+1 is multiplied
by the resulting vector and finally the first entry which is the constant term is converted to
the normal basis representation by multiplying it by the vector representation of 1 using
at most 2n operations in Fq. This again can be done using O(n logn) operations.
4.7 Other Costs
There are two other operations in our multiplier which will be discussed in this section.
Namely polynomial multiplication and conversion from the extended permuted represen-
tation to the normal basis representation.
The polynomial multiplication method can be selected arbitrarily among all avail-
able methods depending on the polynomial lengths and the implementation environments.
Chapter 3 was devoted to moderate polynomial sizes which are applicable to cryptogra-
phy. Although Table 3.6 of that chapter compares our multipliers with others for polyno-
mial lengths up to 8192, the methods can be applied to larger polynomials as well. For
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a thorough analysis of other methods of polynomial multiplication see von zur Gathen &
Gerhard (2003), Chapter 8. We assume the polynomial multipliers of Chapter 3 to require
d7.6 nlog2 3e two-input gates. The above expression has been computed as an upper bound
for the area of those multipliers in the interval 160 < n < 10000.
Another cost which we analyze is the number of bit operations to convert from ex-
tended permuted to the permuted representation. By multiplying the polynomials of
length n + 1 the product which is of length 2n + 1 is converted to a linear combina-
tion of βi + β−i for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n. These values should be converted to the permuted
representation, i.e., βi + β−i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This conversion is done using the fact that β
is a 2n + 1st root of unity. The costs for the case of odd prime numbers are given in the
next theorem.
Theorem 29. Let p, the characteristic of Fqn , be an odd prime number. Conversion from
extended permuted representation of the product in Figure 4.2 into the permuted basis
can be done using at most 2n additions and n scalar multiplications in Fq.
Proof. The conversion from the extended permuted representation to the permuted basis
must be done for the constant term and βi + β−i when i > n. Since β is a 2n + 1th root
of unity βn+k = βn+1−k for 1 ≤ k ≤ n and βn+k + β−n−k = βn+1−k + β−n−1+k. Hence
the corresponding coefficients must be added together. This is done using n additions.
The mapping of the constant term is done by multiplying it with the vector of represen-
tation of 1 in the permuted normal basis. This is done with at most n additions and n
multiplications in Fq.
The above task can be done using n additions when the characteristic of the finite
field is 2 since in that case the constant term vanishes, as will be shown later using the
following lemma.
Lemma 30. For any positive integer n the binomial coefficient (2n
n
)
is an even number.
Proof. This can be easily proven using Lucas’ theorem. This theorem (see PlanetMath
(2002)) states that for any two positive integers a and b with p-adic representations
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Let nm−1nm−2 · · ·n0 be the binary representation of n and k be its first nonzero digit from
the right, i.e., for each j < k we have nj = 0 and nk = 0. Since the binary representation
of 2n is that of n shifted by one position to left, the digit on the kth position of the binary




≡ 0 mod 2





is equal to zero and (4.30).
Theorem 31. Let ϕc(x) be the polynomial representation of the product c, as shown in
Figure 4.2 and q be a power of 2. Then the constant term in ϕc(x) is zero.
Proof. According to Theorem 8 and Lemma 30 the entry l0,0 is the only nonzero entry l0,j
of L2k , for every integer k and 0 ≤ j < 2k. On the other hand, as we saw in Section 4.4,
zeros are inserted to the beginning of the permuted normal representations of a and b and
the entries at the index 0 of these two new vectors are zero. Hence the constant terms in
polynomials ϕa and ϕb in Figure 4.2 are zero and since ϕc is the product of ϕa and ϕb the
constant term in that polynomial is zero, too.
Using the materials which are presented herein we can summarize the costs of our
multiplier in the following theorem. Since we can use any suitable polynomial multiplier,
the presented costs depend on the polynomial multiplication methods used.
Theorem 32. Let Fqn be a finite field of characteristic p, which contains an optimal
normal basis of type 2. Let further δi,j be the Kronecker delta as stated in Lemma 20,
M(n) be the number of Fq-operations to multiply two polynomials of degree n − 1, η(r)
be as given in Lemma 21, r1 = dlogp(n + 1)e, and r2 = dlogp(2n + 1)e. Multiplication
in this finite field, in normal basis, can be done using at most
n + 2(1− δp,2)n+ 2η(r1) + η(r2) + M(n+ 1)
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.15: (a) The matrices P6 and P8 and (b) their factorizations. All nonzero entries
which belong only to P6 are in black and other nonzero entries in P8 are in gray.
operations in Fq. For sufficiently large n the above expression is upper bounded by
M(n+ 1) + 3n+ 2(2n+ 1)p2 logp(2n+ 1).
It should be pointed out that for the case p = 2 we have T 2 = 0, for the matrix L in
Theorem 26, and Equation 4.29 implies that each Bk is its own inverse and computing pin
has the same cost as νn.
The matrices L11 and P6 when p = 2, i.e., the case of the example in Section 4.3 and
their factorizations are shown in Figures 4.15 and 4.16, respectively.
4.8 Comparison
The multiplier which is proposed in this section is especially efficient when the extension
degree n is much larger than the size of the ground field q. One practical application




Figure 4.16: (a) The matrices L11 and L16 and (b) their factorizations. All nonzero entries
which belong only to L16 are in gray, whereas common entries ofL16 and L11 are in black.
this multiplier with some other structures, from the literature, which are proposed for
multiplication in such fields using normal bases of type 2. The field extensions which are
discussed here are from Table 4.1.
The first structure, which we study here is the circuit of Sunar & Koc¸ (2001) with
n(5n − 1)/2 gates. The second circuit is from Gao et al. (1995). The idea behind this
multiplier is to consider the representation
a1(β + β
−1) + · · ·+ an(β
n + β−n)
as the sum of two polynomials
a1β + · · ·+ anβ
n and anβ−n + · · ·+ a1β−1.
To multiply two elements four polynomials of degree n should be multiplied together.
However, because of the symmetry only two multiplications are necessary which also
result in the other two products by mirroring the coefficients. The cost of a multiplication
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using this circuit is 2M(n) + 2n, where M(n) is the cost of multiplying two polynomials
of length n.
Since we are interested in hardware implementations of algorithms we compare the
circuits with respect to both area and area-time. The propagation delay of the multiplier
of Sunar & Koc¸ (2001) is 1 + dlog2 ne gates. The propagation delay of the multiplier of
this chapter consists of two parts: the first one belongs to the conversion circuits which is
2+2dlog2 ne and the other part corresponds to the polynomial multiplier. We compute the
propagation delay of each polynomial multiplier for that special case. The propagation
delay of the multiplier of Gao et al. (1995) is two plus the delay of each polynomial
multiplier which must again be calculated for each special case.
The area and AT parameters of these three circuits are compared with each other
and the results are shown in Figure 4.17. In these diagrams polynomial multiplication
is done using the methods of Chapter 3. As it can be seen the area of the proposed
multiplier is always better than the other two structures. But the AT parameter is larger
for small finite fields. This shows that, as we have mentioned, this method is appropriate
for applications where only small area is available or where the finite fields are large.
Economical applications, where small FPGAs should be used are situations of this sort.
The AT parameter of the proposed multiplier is O(n log3 n(log log n)3), whereas that of
the structure in Sunar & Koc¸ (2001) is O(n2 log n).
4.9 Conclusion
This chapter presented a new method for multiplication in finite fields using optimal nor-
mal bases of type 2. The area of this multiplier is smaller than other proposed structures
but has a higher propagation delay, hence is suitable for low area implementations. The
most important property of this multiplier, which is inherited from its conceptual par-
ent in Gao et al. (1995), is the ability of using polynomial multipliers for normal bases.
This enables designers to select the most appropriate structure, from the well studied area
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The multiplier of Sunar & Koc¸ (2001)
The multiplier of Gao et al. (1995)
The proposed multiplier



























Figure 4.17: Comparing the (a) area (as the number of two-input gates) and (b) the AT
parameter (as the product of the number of two-input gates and the delay of a single gate)
of three multipliers for binary finite fields with extension degrees from Table 4.1.
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of polynomial multipliers, to fit their special conditions. The advantage of this struc-
ture, compared to that of Gao et al. (1995), is the reduction of the number of operations
from two polynomial multiplications to one multiplication plus a small circuit of size
O(n logn) for the change of representation. The materials of this chapter were arranged
in the following parts:
• First the definitions of the Gauss periods and optimal normal bases of type 2 re-
viewed from the literature.
• The structure of the multiplier and the definitions of the used data structures were
presented in Section 4.3.
• The data structures for the change of representations were introduced. Some facts
about their matrices were proved, which resulted in special factorizations. These
factorizations allowed the change of representations to be done using O(n logn)
operations.
• The costs corresponding to the other parts of the multiplier are briefly studied.
• Finally Section 4.8 compared the area and AT measures of the proposed mul-
tiplier with two other structures from the literature for the finite fields F2n , for
160 < n < 5000, in which optimal normal bases of type 2 exist. Results showed
that the asymptotically small area of the multiplier makes it even attractive for el-
liptic curve cryptography, where the finite field sizes are not very large (160 <
n < 600). But designers should note the long propagation delay and use it only for
applications where the area is limited or too expensive or for large finite fields.
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Works
The aim of this work is to present the design stages of an elliptic curve co-processor.
Elliptic curve cryptography is going to be an important part of cryptography because of its
relatively short key length and higher efficiency as compared to other well-known public
key crypto-systems like RSA. Chapter 1 contains a very brief overview of cryptography,
FPGAs, and parameters which are used for designing the circuit.
Chapter 2 studies the stages of the design of a high performance elliptic curve co-
processor. It is shown in this chapter that for small area applications, the combination
of polynomial basis for the finite field representation and the Montgomery method for
the point representation and scalar multiplication, is best. In addition, it is shown in this
chapter that it is always better to use as much parallelism as possible in the finite field
arithmetic level rather than in the bit-level. This means that for example, if allowed by
the algorithm two serial multipliers are better than a single multiplier which produces two
output bits in one clock cycle. A comparison between all of the published reports is not
possible due to differences in hardware platforms. But the comparison with a circuit on
the same FPGA shows the high performance of the co-processor presented here.
The rest of this work studies different methods to improve the efficiency of the finite
field multiplication as a ground operation in elliptic curve cryptography. The results of
Chapter 3 propose a novel pipelined architecture for the multiplication of polynomials
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over F2. This chapter begins with a machine-independent improvement of the Karatsuba
method by combining different multiplication methods and continues with the applica-
tion of pipelining as a machine-dependent optimization to further improve the results. Al-
though these results are not built into the designed co-processor, the comparisons between
this structure and other classical methods for 240-bit polynomials show the suitability for
applications in elliptic curve cryptography by covering the NIST finite finite field F233.
Finally Chapter 4 presents a small area normal basis multiplier. This multiplier re-
duces the multiplication in optimal normal bases of type 2 to one polynomial multipli-
cation and a small circuit of size O(n logn). These results are probably not directly
applicable to generic elliptic curves because of the high propagation delay in their circuits
and the fact that for these curves polynomial bases are better, as is shown in Chapter 2.
They can instead be applied to Koblitz curves, where several squarings should be done for
a single point multiplication (see Hankerson et al. (2003), Section 4.1.2, Page 163) or to
finite field inversion, where there are a lot of squarings compared to multiplications. It is
better to perform these squarings in normal bases. Another advantage of this structure is
its efficiency for the change of representation between polynomial and normal bases. This
change of representation, which is used by Park et al. (2003) to strengthen the systems
against side channel attacks, can be done by the multiplier of this chapter usingO(n logn)
instead of the assumed O(n2) operations. Another possible application of this system is
in systems where several normal basis multiplications can be done in parallel. In this case
pipelining can be used to decrease the latency of the system while keeping the area to a
minimum. This happens, in fields of characteristic 3 for identity based cryptosystems, as
also mentioned in Granger et al. (2005). These can be considered as the future research
directions of this project.
Appendix A
Karatsuba multiplication Formulas for




2 + a1x + a0,
b(x) = b2x
2 + b1x + b0),
P0 = a0b0, P1 = (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1), P2 = a1b1,
P3 = (a0 + a2)(b0 + b2), P4 = (a1 + a2)(b1 + b2), P5 = a2b2,
a(x)b(x) = P0(1 + x + x





2 + x3 + x4).
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2 + b1x + b0),
P0 = a0b0, P1 = a1b1, P2 = a2b2, P3 = a3b3, P4 = a4b4, P5 = a5b5,
P6 = a6b6, P7 = a7b7,
P8 = (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1), P9 = (a0 + a2)(b0 + b2), P10 = (a1 + a3)(b1 + b3),
P11 = (a2 + a3)(b2 + b3), P12 = (a0 + a4)(b0 + b4), P13 = (a1 + a5)(b1 + b5),
P14 = (a2 + a6)(b2 + b6), P15 = (a3 + a7)(b3 + b7), P16 = (a4 + a5)(b4 + b5),
P17 = (a4 + a6)(b4 + b6), P18 = (a5 + a7)(b5 + b7), P19 = (a6 + a7)(b6 + b7),
P20 = (a0 + a1 + a2 + a3)(b0 + b1 + b2 + b3), P21 = (a0 + a1 + a4 + a5)(b0 + b1 + b4 + b5),
P22 = (a0 + a2 + a4 + a6)(b0 + b2 + b4 + b6), P23 = (a1 + a3 + a5 + a7)(b1 + b3 + b5 + b7),
P24 = (a1 + a2 + a5 + a6)(b1 + b2 + b5 + b6), P25 = (a2 + a3 + a6 + a7)(b2 + b3 + b6 + b7),
P26 = (a0 + a1 + a2 + a3 + a4 + a5 + a6 + a7)(b0 + b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 + b5 + b6 + b7),
a(x)b(x) = P0(1 + x
1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7)+
P8(x
1 + x3 + x5 + x7) + P1(x
1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8)+
P9(x
2 + x3 + x6 + x7) + P20(x
3 + x7) + P10(x
3 + x4 + x7 + x8)+
P2(x
2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8 + x9) + P11(x
3 + x5 + x7 + x9)+
P3(x
3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8 + x9 + x10) + P12(x
4 + x5 + x6 + x7)+
P21(x
5 + x7) + P13(x
5 + x6 + x7 + x8) + P22(x
6 + x7) + P26(x
7)+
P23(x
7 + x8) + P14(x
6 + x7 + x8 + x9) + P24(x
7 + x9)+
P15(x
7 + x8 + x9 + x10) + P4(x
4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8 + x9 + x10 + x11)+
P16(x
5 + x7 + x9 + x11) + P5(x
5 + x6 + x7 + x8 + x9 + x10 + x11 + x12)+
P17(x
6 + x7 + x10 + x11) + P25(x
7 + x11) + P18(x
7 + x8 + x11 + x12)+
P6(x
6 + x7 + x8 + x9 + x10 + x11 + x12 + x13)+
+P19(x
7 + x9 + x11 + x13) + P7(x
7 + x8 + x9 + x10 + x11 + x12 + x13 + x14).
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Fqn The finite field with qn elements
M(n) Number of bit operations for multiplication of polynomials of
length n
Q A fixed point on an elliptic curve
−R The additive inverse of the point R on an elliptic curve
O The point at infinity: the zero element of the group of points
on an elliptic curve
mR The integer m times the point R on an elliptic curve
a, b Parameters of an elliptic curve over a field of characteristic 2
ω The root of the irreducible polynomial generating a polynomial
basis
f(x) The irreducible polynomial defining a polynomial basis
α Normal element
w The word-length of serial-parallel multipliers
P Polynomial basis
H(xk) The Hamming weight or the number of nonzero coefficients in
the representation of xk
ALFSR(n,P, w) The area or the number of two-input gates in an LFSR multi-
plier for F2n of word-length w and in a polynomial basis P
DLFSR(n,P, w) The delay (or the minimum clock period) of an LFSR multi-
plier for F2n of word-length w and in a polynomial basis P
TX The delay of an XOR gate
TA The delay of an AND gate
K2 The 2-segment Karatsuba method
M
(2)(n) The number of bit operations to multiply two n-bit polynomi-
als by recursively applying the 2-segment Karatsuba method
K3 The 3-segment Karatsuba method
M
(3)(n) The number of bit operations to multiply two n-bit polynomi-
als by recursively applying the 3-segment Karatsuba method
M
(K2K3)(6n) The number of bit operations to multiply two polynomials of
length 6n by applying K2 on top of K3
M
(K3K2)(6n) The number of bit operations to multiply two polynomials of
length 6n by applying K3 on top of K2




r The group of units modulo r
#Fqnk The number of elements in Fqnk
β A primitive rth root of unity in Fqnk
(a
(B)
i )1≤i≤n The vector of the representation of the element a with respect
to the basis B
a
(B)
i The ith entry in the vector of the representation of the element
a with respect to the basis B
Fq[x]
≤n Polynomials in variable x over Fq with degree not larger than
n.
ϕa See Section 4.3. The polynomial representation of the element
a
(yi)1≤i≤n The vector of elements yi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(A)i,j The entry in the ith row and jth column of the matrix A
Lq,n See Definition 6. The parameter q can be omitted.
νn The linear mapping corresponding to Lq,n
Pq,n See Definition 9. The parameter q can be omitted.
pin The linear mapping corresponding to Pq,n
L′pr See Definition 6.
Θpr See Definition 11
L
(i,j)
pr The block in the ith row and jth column in the block represen-
tation of Lpr
Br See Definition 13
µadd(k) The number of Fq-additions to multiply Bk by a vector in Fp
k
q
µmult(k) The number of Fq-multiplications to multiply Bk by a vector
in Fpkq




Φn See Lemma 24
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List of acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ASIC Application-Specific Integrated Array
AT Area-time
CLB Configurable Logic Block
DES Digital Encryption Standard
DFT Discrete Fourier Transformation
DLP Discrete Logarithm Problem
DSP Digital Signal Processor
DSS Digital Signature Standard
ECCo Elliptic Curve Cryptography Co-Processor
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
FFT Fast Fourier Transformation
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
IDEA International Data Encryption Algorithm
JNI JAVA Native Interface
LFSR Linear Feedback Shift Register
LUT Look-Up Table
MO Massey-Omura
PAR Place and Route
PCI Peripheral Component Interface
RAM Random Access Memory
RISC Reduced Instruction Set Computer
RSA (Ron) Rivest, (Fiat) Shamir, and (Leonard) Adleman
RTL Register Transfer Level
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SoC System on Chip













asymptotically fast multiplication, 5









code generator, 6, 78
combinational, 6, 18
combinational pipelined multiplier, 82
computation graph, 79
configurable logic blocks (CLBs), 17
control line multiplexer, 57
control module, 55







delay of buffers, 31
digital signature standard (DSS), 13
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), 9, 13
Discrete Fourier Transformation (DFT), 101










electronic commerce servers, 3
elliptic curve, 11
Elliptic Curve Co-processor (ECCo), 2
elliptic curve cryptography, 2






factorization matrix, 96, 97




Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), 2,
16
finite field arithmetic, 26
finite field multipliers, 5
finite fields, 4
FPGA 4-input LUT model, 31
FPGA model, 32
FPGA-Based Co-Processor, 53
Gauss period, 84, 86
generic elliptic curves, 5






irreducible polynomial, 35, 39
Jacobian representation, 44
JAVA Native Interface (JNI), 21
JAVA security provider, 21






Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR), 32
Look-Up Tables (LUTs), 18
Lucas’ theorem, 116
Lo´pez-Dahab representations, 44







multiplication time, 30, 31
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multiplier, 55
normal basis, 6, 28, 38, 83
normal element, 83
optimal normal bases, 84






permuted normal basis, 87
pipeline registers, 19, 79
pipelined Karatsuba multiplier, 72
pipelining, 4, 6
place and route (par), 32
point multiplication time, 5
point addition, 26, 43
point at infinity, 11, 41
point doubling, 26, 43
point multiplication, 11, 26
point negation, 26
polynomial basis, 28, 39
private key, 2, 8
projective representation, 44
propagation delay, 19, 32
public key, 2, 8
Rapid prototyping platform (Raptor) card,
20
recursive, 6
reflection matrix, 96, 97
Register Transfer Level (RTL), 78
routing resource, 19
scalar multiplication, 26, 46













Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), 15
theoretical 2-input gate model, 31
time, 5
time complexity, 32, 35
time parameter, 19
trapdoor, 8
trinomial, 35
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Weierstrass equation, 11
word multipliers, 34
word register, 34
word-length, 30, 32
